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I. INTRODUCTION
February 8, 1996 was a much-heralded day in
the telecommunications industry. After many
years of behind-the-scenes negotiations, open
floor debates and legislative sessions, the Tele-
communications Act of 1996 ("Telecom Act") was
at last signed into law.' The goal of this legislation
was to eliminate the last vestiges of monopoly in
the United States telecommunications sector by
introducing competition into the local phone
market 2 controlled by the former Bell System,
now the Regional Bell Operating Companies
("RBOCs"), for over 100 years. 3 The Telecom Act
I Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56 (codified in scattered sections of 47 U.S.C.).
2 See DAVID WOLcorr, An ALTS Analysis: Local Competition
Policy and the New Economy, Assoc. for Local Telecomms. Ser-
vices (Feb. 2, 2001) [hereinafter WoLco'rr].
3 On January 8, 1982, AT&T and the Department of Jus-
tice announced the settlement agreement to break up AT&T.
On August 24, 1982, Judge Harold H. Greene affirmed this
divestiture agreement, in the Modification of Final Judg-
ment. See Modification of Final Judgment, United States v.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub nom.,
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). The divesti-
ture agreement ordered the breakup of AT&T ("Ma Bell") to
create seven Regional Bell Operating Companies ("Baby
Bells"), including Ameritech, Pacific Telesis, Bell Atlantic,
BellSouth, Southwestern Bell, NYNEX and U.S. West. See also
Harry Newton, Newton's Telecom Dictionary, 577 (Ray
Horak ed., CMP Books 17th ed. 2001) [hereinafter
NEWrON'S]. Today, only four of the original seven Baby Bells
still remain. Bell Atlantic, GTE and NYNEX merged to form
Verizon. Southwestern Bell became SBC and merged with
Ameritech and SNET and acquired Pacific Telesis. U.S. West
underwent a makeover to become the new Qwest, the one
instance where a long distance company acquired a BOC. See
also 47 U.S.C. §153(4) (Supp. V 1998) (defining the term
"Bell Operating Company").
4 In re Deployment of Wireline Services Offering Ad-
vanced Telecommunications Capability, First Report and Or-
der and Further Notice of Proposed Rulemaking, 114 FCC
Rcd. 4761, para. 13 (1999); see also H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-
458, at 1 (1996), reprinted in 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 10 (the pur-
established a "pro-competitive, deregulatory na-
tional policy framework for telecommunications,
opening all telecommunications markets to com-
petition so as to make advanced telecommunica-
tions and information technologies and services
available to all Americans." 4 To accomplish these
goals, Congress ordered the Federal Communica-
tions Commission (the "Commission" or "FCC") 5
to implement various pro-competitive require-
ments on all incumbent local exchange carriers
("ILECs"),6 with more stringent pro-competitive
market-opening obligations upon the RBOCs that
dominated the local market and controlled bottle-
pose of the Telecom Act was "to provide for a pro-competi-
tive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to ac-
celerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced tele-
communications and information technologies and services
to all Americans and by opening all telecommunications
markets to competition . . . ").
5 See generally NEWrON'S, supra note 3. The Federal Com-
munications Commission is an independent United States
government agency, directly responsible to Congress. The
Commission was established by the Communications Act of
1934 and is charged with regulating interstate and interna-
tional communications by radio, television, wire, satellite and
cable. On March 25, 2002, the Commission instituted a reor-
ganized structure "as part of its reform efforts to make the
FCC more effective, efficient and responsive," http://
www.fcc.gov/Bureaus/Miscellaneous/NewsReleases/2002/
nrmc02O4.html. The newly, reorganized structure consists of
six bureaus: the Media Bureau (formerly the Cable Services
Bureau and the Mass Media Bureau); the Wireline Competi-
tion Bureau (formerly the Common Carrier Bureau); the
Consumer and Governmental Affairs Bureau (formerly the
Consumer Information Bureau); International Bureau; the
Enforcement Bureau; and the Wireless Telecommunications
Bureau. Id.
6 47 U.S.C. §§251-252 (2001); see also 47 U.S.C. §251(h)
defining an "[i]ncumbent local exchange carrier" as a "local
exchange carrier" that provided telephone exchange service
on the date of enactment of the Telecom Act and was consid-
ered a member of the National Exchange Carrier Association
under the Commission's rules or a successor or assign of
such a member.
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neck facilities .7 Today, more than six years after
the passage of the Act, the incumbent local ex-
change carriers have sufficiently opened their lo-
cal networks to competitors and have met the
FCC approved standards in only ten states.8 Even
more telling is that the RBOCs still control 96.8
percent of the local residential and small business
markets and 82.5 percent of the local medium
and large business markets.9
The slow development of local competition is
not tied to a lack of effort or capital by the new
competitive local exchange carriers ("CLECs"). l°
Encouraged by the pro-competitive principles of
the Telecom Act, a large number of well-financed
and experienced competitors entered the local
telecommunications market. 1 "From 1996 to
2000, the CLECs invested over $56 billion in
broadband networks, 12 more than either the
cable companies or the RBOCs."'13 In addition to
these intensive capital investments, CLECs cre-
ated 94,000 new jobs as of 2000.14 The efforts of
7 47 U.S.C. §271 (2001). In section 271 of the Telecom
Act, Congress constructed a 14-point checklist that an incum-
bent local exchange carrier must satisfy in order to demon-
strate that it has sufficiently opened its local markets to con-
petition. SeeJean F. Walker, Paved with Good Intentions: How
InterLATA Data Relief Undermines the Competitive Provisions of the
Act, 53 FED. COMM. L.J. 533, 543 (2001). The 14-point check-
list addresses separate pieces of the market-opening provi-
sions set out in sections 251 and 252 of the 1996 Act. A BOC
cannot fulfill the checklist unless it shows that it has com-
plied with all of the various aspects of the market-opening
requirements outlined in sections 251 and 252.
8 See generally http://www.fcc.gov. As of April 1, 2002, the
FCC had approved Verizon's §271 applications for Connecti-
cut, Massachusetts, New York, Pennsylvania and Rhode Is-
land and SBC's §271 applications for Arkansas, Kansas, Mis-
souri, Oklahoma and Texas.
9 Seth Schiesel, Sitting Pretty: How Baby Bells May Conquer
Their World, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 2001, at C3.
10 WOLCOTr, supra note 2.
'11 47 U.S.C. §251(c) (2001). Congress contemplated
three paths to competition in the local markets. First, com-
petitors could compete through "interconnection," or the
building out of their own separate networks and then inter-
connecting to the incumbents' networks. Second, competi-
tors could compete through a combination of their own facil-
ities and "unbundling," or leasing of unbundled network ele-
ments ("UNEs"), the individual piece parts of the local net-
works. Finally, competitors could compete through "resale"
of the incumbents' services.
12 See 47 C.F.R. §1.7001 2002. The FCC has defined
"broadband" networks as those capable of providing lines or
wireless channels with information carrying capability in ex-
cess of 200 Kbps upstream and downstream. Id.; see also Hear-
ing on Reviewing Competition and Antitrust Issues Relating to the
Telecommunications Act Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, 106th Cong. 13
(1999) (statement of former FCC Chairman William E. Ken-
these new entrants have been impeded by the
RBOCs. Despite the market-opening mandates of
the Telecom Act,' 5 RBOCs have consistently en-
gaged in anticompetitive practices, including the
use of stall tactics, pricing maneuvers and supply-
ing misleading information.' 6 For example, in
March 2000, the Commission charged Bell Atlan-
tic (now Verizon) with using delay tactics in New
York, including failure to process orders from
competitors resulting in service delays to competi-
tors' customers.' 7 As a result, the Commission
fined Bell Atlantic $3 million.' 8 "The Bells have
also used a variety of pricing maneuvers to thwart
competition.' 19 By charging competitors exorbi-
tant rates for the necessary bottleneck network el-
ements, the Bells make it too expensive for com-
petitors to compete.20 Many competitors have
been driven out of the market through such pric-
ing tactics.
The sad reality is that the consumer is the real
loser in this battle between the new, smaller en-
nard) (defining broadband as "two-way, communications of
voice, data and images via any technology and, most impor-
tantly, at vastly higher speeds than most consumers have ever
had in their homes") [hereinafter Kennard statement].
13 Statement of John Windhausen, Jr., President of As-
soc. for Local Telecomms. Services (Sept. 26, 2001), available
at http://www.alts.org/news.html; http://www.alts.org/
news.html; see also Hearing Before the House Small Business
Comm. Regulatory Reform and Oversight Subcomm., and Rural En-
terprises, Agriculture and Technology Subcomm. on Eliminating the
Digital Divide-Who Will Wire Rural America, 107th Cong.
(2001) (testimony of Susan McAdams).
14 WOLCOTT, supra note 2 at 4-5.
15 These stringent requirements designed to open the lo-
cal telecommunications markets to competition may be
found in 47 U.S.C. §251 (c) (1), which imposes a duty to nego-
tiate in good faith; 47 U.S.C. §251 (c) (2), which imposes a
duty to interconnect at 'just, reasonable, and nondiscrimina-
tory rates"; 47 U.S.C. §251(c)(3), which imposes a duty to
make available access to unbundled network elements on a
'just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory" basis.
16 Christina Hange Kukuk, Ameritech is Still in Hot Water
over Poor Service in Ohio, AKRON BEACON J.,Jan. 18, 2001, at 2.
17 Press Release, Federal Communications Commission,
FCC Ensures Bell Atlantic Compliance with Terms of Long
Distance Approval; Bell Atlantic Agrees to Pay Up to $27 Mil-
lion $3 Million Payment Now and Up to $24 Million Later if
Bell Atlantic Fails to Meet Specified Performance Standards
(Mar. 9, 2000), http://www.fcc.gov/eb/NewsReleases/bel-
latl.html.
18 Id.
19 WOLcOrr, supra note 2, at app. A, n.3 ("For example,
a typical loop charge to remove equipment from a line is
under $200. By comparison, Bell Atlantic recently filed a
tariff in New York, which included a charge of up to $750 per
loop for removal of loop devices").
20 Id.
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trants and the Goliath-like RBOCs. 2' The con-
sumer bears the brunt of the RBOCs' monopolis-
tic behaviors in being denied the fruits of compe-
tition and instead being relegated to poorer ser-
vice quality, less innovative service offerings and
higher prices.2 2 In Goldwasser v. Ameritech, one
group of consumers decided not to take this lying
down. 23 Four individual residents of Illinois, Indi-
ana, Michigan and Wisconsin joined together in a
class action suit against Ameritech, the incumbent
local exchange carrier in the region.2 4 The four
plaintiffs, who were all subscribers to Ameritech's
local phone service, alleged that Ameritech had
"committed monopolistic acts in furtherance of
an anticompetitive objective of maintaining a mo-
nopoly for local phone service in the five-state re-
gion. ' 2 5 Citing 20 specific monopolistic behaviors,
the plaintiffs claimed that Ameritech had not only
failed to grant competitors access to its facilities,
but also had affirmatively impeded competitors'
ability to enter those markets served by Amer-
itech. 26 The plaintiffs asserted that such practices
violated the Telecommunications Act of 199627
and the antitrust laws under the Sherman Act. 28
The district court dismissed the complaint on the
basis that the plaintiffs lacked standing to sue
under the antitrust laws. 29 The U.S. Court of Ap-
peals for the Seventh Circuit overturned the lower
court's ruling on standing, but ultimately decided
that the Telecom Act was controlling and the
21 Eric M. Swedenburg, Promoting Competition in the
Telecom Markets: Why the FCC Should Adopt a Less Stringent Ap-
proach to its Review of Section 271 Applications, 84 CORNELL L.
REv. 1419, 1431 (1999) (stating that the "consumer has yet to
reap any significant benefit the 1996 Act allegedly sowed");
see also Mike Mills and Paul Farhi, This Is a Free Market? The
Telecommunications Act So Far: Higher Prices, Few Benefits, WASH.
POST, Jan. 19, 1997, at Hi (noting that the "1996 [Act] was
hardly a bellwether for the kind of consumer benefits prom-
ised by the law's supporters").
22 See, e.g., Competition in Local Phone Service Fails to Con-
nect, USA TODAY, Feb. 7, 2001, at 10A, available at http://
www.usatoday.com/usatonline/20010207/3048526s.html.
("Consumers ... are paying the price. The cost of local ser-
vice has been climbing at a time when costs for intensely
competitive long-distance and wireless services have
dropped . . . And quality of service remains mixed at best,
with customer complaints up sharply in some regions.").
23 Goldwasser v. Ameritech, 222 F.3d 390 (7th Cir. 2000).
24 Id. at 392. At the time the case was brought, Ameritech
provided local telephone service to subscribers and custom-
ers in a five-state region: Illinois, Indiana, Michigan, Ohio
and Wisconsin.
25 Goldwasser v. Ameritech, No. 97 C 6788, at 6 (N.D.
Illinois Feb. 4, 1998).
26 Id. at 13-17 (listing 20 anticompetitive actions, plain-
tiffs alleged that Ameritech took affirmative actions to pre-
plaintiffs had failed to state a claim under the an-
titrust laws. 3
0
The Goldwasser decision has had a significant
impact on the Telecom Act. Goldwasser vitiated the
spirit of the Telecom Act by ignoring historical
and legal precedent, the Act's express and im-
plied antitrust savings clauses and the legislative
history supporting the inclusion of these clauses.
In the process, the decision emboldened many of
the incumbent local exchange carriers to con-
tinue to flout the requirements of the Telecom
Act without fear of negative repercussions. 31 The
Goldwasser decision has consequently introduced
even more uncertainty into an already uncertain
telecommunications marketplace. The question
hovering in both legal courtrooms and corporate
boardrooms is whether, in the wake of Goldwasser,
antitrust enforcement has any role to play in con-
straining anticompetitive behavior among com-
petitors in a marketplace governed by the regula-
tory mandates implemented under the Telecom
Act. If this question is left unanswered, the com-
petition game that was started by the Telecom Act
may soon be over with the monopolies declared
the winners. As a result, Congress must take ac-
tion to stop the dominos from falling under the
toppling influence of Goldwasser.
Congress recognized that this uphill battle to
unlock a 100-year-old state-sanctioned monopoly
required battles on two fronts-the telecommuni-
vent competition in the local phone service market).
27 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56. Plaintiffs brought claim under §§206 and 207 of
the Communications Act of 1934, as amended by the Tele-
communications Act of 1996. See 47 U.S.C. §§206 and 207.
Under §206, common carriers are liable "for the full amount
of damages sustained in consequence of any such violation of
the provisions of" the Act. 47 U.S.C. §206. Under §207, in-
jured parties may either file a complaint at the Commission
or "bring suit for the recovery of damages." 47 U.S.C. §207;
see generally Philip J. Weiser, Federal Common Law, Cooperative
Federalism, and the Enforcement of the Telecom Act, 76 N.Y.U. L.
Rxv. 1692, 1759-60 (2001) (discussing the role that "a puni-
tive damage requirement" plays in helping "to guard against
willful violations of the Act's market-opening requirements
28 Sherman Antitrust Act of 1890, Pub. L. No. 107-203,
26 Stat. 209 (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§1-7) (1997).
29 GoldwasserI, No. 97 C 6788 at 10.
30 See generally Goldwasser II, 222 F. 3d at 390.
31 Id. at 401402 (only "at some appropriate point down
the road [can] antitrust laws . . . move to the fore"); see also
Steve Peacock, Tauzin to Comply with FCC Request for Expanded
Enforcement Power, COMM. DALY, May 8, 2001, available at 2001
WL 5053136 (opponents of the Goldwasser decision believe
that it eliminated an "important tool ... to challenge an-
ticompetitive behavior of incumbents... ").
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cations policy front and the antitrust policy front.
While the regulatory provisions of the Act de-
tailed certain obligations, Congress recognized
that the federal court system would also have an
important role to play in ensuring the delivery of
the expected benefits to consumers and therefore
intended to preserve the role of the antitrust laws.
This Comment will first provide a historical over-
view of the development of the antitrust laws, pri-
marily the Sherman Act and the Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996. This historical overview will
demonstrate the harmonious coexistence of these
two approaches. Next, this Comment will discuss
the Seventh Circuit's decision in Goldwasser v.
Ameritech and analyze the court's reasoning in its
holding that the antitrust laws did not apply to an-
ticompetitive behavior relating to obligations im-
posed by the Telecom Act. This Comment will
subsequently show the divergent directions taken
by the lower courts in interpreting Goldwasser, cre-
ating an overall environment of legal and regula-
tory uncertainty. Then, this Comment will demon-
strate Goldwasser's incorrect application of the
plain statutory language of the Telecom Act and
its failure to heed historical and legal precedent,
as well as extensive legislative history. As a result,
this Comment will then assert the need for imme-
diate congressional action to resolve the uncer-
tainty and erosion of competition principles ef-
fected by Goldwasser. Finally, this Comment will
discuss H.R. 1698, the "American Broadband
Competition Act," and demonstrate its viability as
a potential Goldwasser remedy.
32 ROBERT H. BoRK, THE ANTITRUST PARADOX: A POLICY
AT WAR WITH ITSELF 19-20 (Basic Books, Inc. 1993) (1978)
[hereinafter BORK].
33 See generally 15 U.S.C. §§1-2.
34 15 U.S.C. §1 ("Every contract, combination in the
form of trust or otherwise, or conspiracy, in restraint of trade
or commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, is hereby declared to be illegal... "); see alsoJOHN H.
SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELTZER, THE ANTITRUST LAWS: A
PRIMER 14-15 (2d. ed. 1996) (according to the authors, the
presence of a "contract," "combination," or "conspiracy" is
the "trigger ... In the absence of some cooperative conduct
or joint action involving at least two separate companies, this
provision of the Sherman Act does not apply.").
35 15 U.S.C. §2 ("Every person who shall monopolize, or
attempt to monopolize, or combine or conspire with any
other person or persons, to monopolize any part of the trade
of commerce among the several States, or with foreign na-
tions, shall be deemed guilty of a felony... "); see alsoJohn
14. SHENEFIELD & IRWIN M. STELTZER, THE ANTITRUST LAws: A
II. HISTORICAL OVERVIEW
A. The Sherman Act
With one sweep of his pen on July 2, 1890, Pres-
ident Benjamin Harrison granted federal courts
the authority to develop a body of federal anti-
trust common law.32 The Sherman Act consists of
two main provisions. 33 Section 1 focuses on re-
strictive agreements, specifically wrongful con-
tracts, trusts or conspiracies, which operate "in re-
straint of trade or commerce," both nationally
and internationally. 34 Section 2 concentrates on
the attempted or actual abuse of monopoly
power, both nationally and internationally. 35 To-
gether, these two provisions were the first enunci-
ation of federal antitrust policy. 36
The passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 was
motivated by the fear that unchecked monopo-
lists, namely concentrated industrial goliaths such
as Standard Oil and other trusts, would threaten
capitalism and the operation of the free market. 37
Senator Sherman, explaining the need for a
check on such monopolists, stated that if we
would "not submit to an emperor, we should not
submit to an autocrat of trade with power to both
prevent competition and fix the price of any com-
modity."38 Congress therefore enacted the Sher-
man Act to invest federal courts with the authority
sufficient to ensure that no one "king" reigned
"over the production, transportation and sale of
any of the necessities of life."3 9 Today, it is still ac-
cepted that the Sherman Act was enacted to pro-
PRIMER 18 (2d. ed. The AEI Press 1996) (1995) Id. at 18 (stat-
ing that "the section condemns not sheer size, but abusive
conduct by a monopolist, or unilateral or collective efforts to
engage in exclusionary or predatory conduct to obtain mo-
nopoly status").
36 BORK, supra note 32, at 19.
37 See 21 CONG. REc. 2455, 2460 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1890)
(statement of Sen. Sherman) (warning against "... the con-
centration of capital into vast combinations to control pro-
duction and trade to break down competition. These combi-
nations already defy or control powerful transportation cor-
porations and reach State authorities. They reach out their
Briarean arms to every part of our country. They are im-
ported from abroad. Congress alone can deal with them, and
if we are unwilling or unable there will soon be a trust for
every production and a master to fix the price for every ne-
cessity of life.").
38 Id. at 2457.
39 21 CONG. Rc. 2455, 2460 (daily ed. Mar. 21, 1890)
(statement of Sen. Sherman).
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mote consumer welfare and competitive market-
places. 40 Yet, while Congress gave the courts the
authority to develop a body of antitrust law, it de-
clined to set forth specific tools in the statute to
direct the courts' accomplishment of that goal.4'
As a result, the applicability of the Sherman Act
was soon tested when the Supreme Court decided
the first antitrust suit in 1895.42 In United States v.
E. C. Knight Co., the Supreme Court addressed the
question whether American Sugar Refining Co.'s
acquisition of E. C. Knight Co. and three other
independent sugar refiners created a monopoly
in the manufacture of sugar.43 However, the
Court, holding that a monopoly over the manu-
facture of a commodity was not sufficient to "mo-
nopolize commerce," refused to apply the Sher-
man Act to the sugar trust.44 In 1904, though, the
Supreme Court altered the course of federal anti-
trust policy with its decision in Northern Securities
Co. et al. v. United States.45 In Northern Securities, the
Supreme Court, applying the Sherman Act to
holding companies, held that the acquisition of a
controlling interest in two competing railroad
companies constituted a "trust" in restraint of in-
terstate commerce.
46
The Court's decision in Northern Securities set
the stage for" . . . the most important decisions in
antitrust"47 -the Standard Oi148 case and the Amer-
ican Tobacco49 case. In Standard Oil, the Court,
"preoccupied with abuses, predatory practices, co-
ercion, unnatural means of gaining and maintain-
ing market power," ordered the breakup of the oil
company into more than 30 individual compa-
nies. 50 However, the Court ruled that not all com-
binations violated the Sherman Act. Rather, only
those unreasonable ones that employed methods
40 DOMINICK T. ARMENTANO, ANTITRUST AND MONOPOLY 6
(The Indep. Inst. 1996) (1990).
41 Apex Hosiery Co. v. Leader, 310 U.S. 469, 489 (1940)
(holding that due to the vagueness of the language of the
Sherman Act "courts have been left to give content to the
statute"); see also BOR.K, supra note 32, at 19 (describing the
consequential evolutionary development of the Sherman
Act).
42 United States v. E. C. Knight Co., 156 U.S. 1 (1895).
43 Id.
44 Id. at 17 (specifying that the manufacture of sugar was
not "an attempt . . . to monopolize commerce, even
though . . .the instrumentality of commerce was necessarily
invoked").
45 Northern Securities Co. et al. v. United States, 193
U.S. 197 (1904).
46 Id. at 338.
47 BORK, supra note 32, at 33.
with "the intent to drive others from the field and
to exclude them from their right to trade" were
illegal and in violation of the Sherman Act.5 1
Echoing Senator Sherman's original fears of un-
checked monopolists, 52 Justice Harlan warned of
the "slavery that would result from aggregations of
capital in the hands of a few individuals and cor-
porations.."53
Similarly, in American Tobacco, the Court af-
firmed the lower court's decision to dissolve
American Tobacco Company on the basis of
"wrongful acts" indicating intent to achieve a mo-
nopolistic position. 54 Writing for the majority, Jus-
tice White justified the application of the Sher-
man Act, stating, "the danger which it was
deemed would arise to individual liberty and the
public well-being from acts like those which this
record exhibits ... led the legislative mind to con-
ceive and enact the Anti-trust act.'' 55 The fear of
misuse of monopoly power that guided the enact-
ment of the Sherman Act has likewise influenced
the Supreme Court in its development of a body
of federal antitrust common law.
In interpreting Section 2 of the Sherman Act,
courts have required a showing of two elements of
monopolization. In United States v. Grinnell Corp.,
Justice Douglas declared that in order for a single
firm to be a monopoly, a two-prong test must be
met: there must be "(1) the possession of monop-
oly power in [a] relevant market, and (2) the will-
ful acquisition or maintenance of that power as
distinguished from growth or development as a
consequence of a superior product, business acu-
men, or historic accident."5 6 The first step in as-
sessing an alleged antitrust violation is to measure
the "monopoly power"57 in order to determine
48 Standard Oil Co. v. United States, 221 U.S. 1 (1911).
49 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106
(1911).
50 BORK, supra note 32, at 38.
51 Standard Oil Co. 221 U.S. at 76.
52 See 21 CONG. REc. 2455, 2457 & 2460 (daily ed. Mar.
21, 1890) (statement of Sen. Sherman).
53 Standard Oil Co. 221 U.S at 83 (H-I.aAN, J. concurring
and dissenting).
54 United States v. American Tobacco Co., 221 U.S. 106,
183 (1911).
55 Id.
56 United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 570-71
(1966).
57 See United States v. E.l. DuPont De Nemours & Co.,
351 U.S. 377, 391 (1956) (defining "monopoly power" as "the
power to control prices or exclude competition").
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whether such power significantly impedes compe-
tition. 58 While courts have traditionally measured
such monopoly power in the context of market
share, they have struggled to define what consti-
tutes a monopolistic market share.59 Generally, "a
75% market share is likely to permit or require an
inference of market power. ' 60 Yet, a holder of
such market share is not in per se violation of sec-
tion 2.61 Rather, in order to be found guilty of
monopolizing or attempting to monopolize, "the
monopolist must have acquired its monopoly by
some improper conduct or course of conduct, or
must have done something improper to maintain
its power. ' 62 While mere possession of monopoly
power does not amount to a violation under sec-
tion 2, a willful attempt to acquire monopoly sta-
tus or maintain monopoly power will violate sec-
tion 2.63
Courts therefore have also required a demon-
stration of the uses and abuses of monopoly
power-the second prong of the test as enunciated
by Justice Douglas in Grinnell.64 For example,
courts have determined that even monopolists
have the right to refuse to cooperate with a com-
petitor;65 however, "where a refusal to deal is ben-
eficial to the monopolist only because it tends to
58 Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570.
59 Id. at 571. The market share was 87% in Grinnell. Id.
However, there is no magic "market share" number. See, e.g.,
United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 424
(2nd Cir. 1945), where Judge Learned Hand held that "it is
doubtful whether sixty or sixty-four percent would be
enough; and certainly thirty-three percent is not"; see also
United States v. United Shoe Mach. Corp., 110 F. Supp. 295,
339 (D. Mass. 1953), affd per curium, 347 U.S. 521 (1954),
where market share was 75-85%. But see Treaty Establishing
the European Economic Community, Mar. 25, 1957, art. 86,
298 U.N.T.S. 11, 48 (effective Jan. 1, 1958) (now renum-
bered Art. 82 by the Treaty of Amsterdam) (prohibiting "any
abuse by one or more undertakings of a dominant position
within the common market or in a substantial part of it...
(emphasis added).
60 Patrick Lynch, Monopolization, Attempted Monopolization
and Joint Ventures, PRAc. L. INST. 287-88 (2001) [hereinafter
Lynch].
61 See BORK COMMUNICATION GROUP LLC, WHITE PAPER,
THE CASE AGAINST MICROSOVr (authored by Robert H.
Bork) 419, 422 ("Size, even if it confers monopoly power, is
not illegal if it is achieved by superior products, service, busi-
ness acumen, or mere luck") [hereinafter Bork, The Case
Against Microsoft]; see also Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 571 (contrast-
ing the deliberate acquisition or maintenance of monopoly
power with "monopoly achieved as a result of historical acci-
dent, business acumen, or the like").
62 Lynch, supra note 60, at 295-96; see also Aspen Skiing
Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp., 472 U.S. 585, 605
(1985); see also United States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148
F.2d 416, 420 (2nd Cir. 1945).
destroy competition, it will be unlawful under sec-
tion 2."66 This theme was recently reiterated in
United States v. Microsoft Corp. where the court
found that Microsoft's use of exclusionary prac-
tices and predatory tactics to maintain its monop-
oly violated both Sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman
Act.6 7 The court explained that Microsoft's exclu-
sive dealings are not unlawful solely because of
their "anticompetitive effect of preserving
Microsoft's monopoly." 6s Rather, the court found
Microsoft's exclusive arrangements violated sec-
tion 2 because they were not supported by any
pro-competitive justification or intended to fur-
ther any pro-competitive business ends. 69
Finally, if a refusal to deal involves an "essential
facility," courts have held monopolists to a stricter
standard. 70 A facility is considered essential "when
it is both critical to the plaintiff's competitive via-
bility and the plaintiff is essential for competition
in the marketplace. '71 The essential facilities doc-
trine first emerged in United States v. Terminal Rail-
road Assoc., 72 which "involved three different
means of crossing the Mississippi when the gov-
ernment finally sued the combination" in 1905
under sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act. 73 In
order to establish liability under the essential facil-
63 Id.
64 Grinnell, 384 U.S. at 570.
65 See Aspen Skiing Co. v. Aspen Highlands Skiing Corp.,
472 U.S. 585 (1985).
66 Lynch, supra note 60, at 297.
67 U.S. v. Microsoft, 253 F.3d 34 (D.C. Cir. 2001). See also
Bork, The Case Against Microsoft, supra note 61, at 422
("Microsoft has, and exerts, the power to exclude rivals by
predatory tactics that do not reflect superior efficiency, tac-
tics whose sole purpose is the destruction of rivals.").
68 Microsoft 253 F.3d at 87 ("A monopolist, like a competi-
tive firm, may have a perfectly legitimate reason for wanting
an exclusive arrangement with its distributors.").
69 Id. at 87-88.
70 See MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T., 708 F.2d
1081 (7th Cir. 1983) (relying on United States v. Terminal R.
Ass'n., 224 U.S. 585, 605 (1985); see also Hearing on Monopoli-
zation and Competition in the Telecommunications Industry Before
the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 97th Cong. 283 (1981) (state-
ment of William G. McGowan, Chairman of the Bd., MCI
Communications Corp.) ("in the classic terminology of anti-
trust law, A.T. & T. controls the essential facility, or the bot-
tleneck . . . which is the local exchange service to which we
must interconnect in order to provide long-distance tele-
phone service to our customers") [hereinafter Hearing on Mo-
nopolization].
71 Phillip Areeda, Essential Facilities: An Epithet in Need of
Limiting Principles, 58 ANTITRUST L.J. 841, 852 (1989).
72 224 U.S. 383 (1912).
73 Abbott B. Lipsky, Jr. andJ. Gregory Sidak, Essential Fa-
cilities, 51 STAN. L. R. 1187, 1189 (May 1999).
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ities doctrine, courts have required the satisfac-
tion of four elements of an essential facility.7 4
First, the defendant must have control of a facility
essential to competition. 75 Second, duplication of
that facility must be impossible or impractical.7 6
Third, it must be feasible to provide access to the
facility.77 And, finally, the defendant must have
denied access to the facility in order to exclude
competition and not for a legitimate business pur-
pose. 78
The body of federal antitrust law that has devel-
oped since the enactment of the Sherman Act is
thus rooted in the American principles of compe-
tition and innovation. Enforcement of the anti-
trust laws is necessary for such competition and
innovation because enforcement efforts "provide
an assurance to investors and entrepre-
neurs.., that they will succeed or fail on the basis
of the creativity and quality of their products and
services, free from the pernicious effects of an-
ticompetitive practices."7 9 The American courts,
who were first tasked with the job of developing
our body of federal antitrust law and who con-
tinue to apply the antitrust laws today, must there-
fore be guided by the dual policy considerations
of promoting competition8 ° on one hand and en-
couraging innovation on the other."'
B. The Telecom Act
In enacting the Telecommunications Act, 82
74 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T., 708 F.2d 1081,
1132-33 (7th Cir. 1983).
75 Id.
76 Id.
77 Id.
78 Id.; see also Hearing on Monopolization, supra note 70, at
299.
79 Hearing on Reviewing Competition and Antitrust Issues Re-
lating to the Telecommunications Act Before the Senate Judiciary
Subcomm. on Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, 106th
Cong. 31 (1999) (statement of former FCC Chairman Reed
E. Hundt).
80 See generally David Turetsky, Antitrust in a More Con-
servative Congress, 41 ANTITRUST BULL., 541, 542 (1996) [here-
inafter Turetsky].
81 See generally 1 WILLIAM MEADE FLETCHER ET. AL.,
FLETCHER CYCLOPEDIA OF THE LAW OF PRIVATE CORPORATIONS
§4983.10 (perm. ed. rev. vol. 1999); see also Turetsky, supra
note 80, at 542.
82 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104,
110 Stat. 56.
83 See id. at 56 (preamble).
84 Id.; see also, H.R. CONF. REP. No. 104-458, at 1 (1996)
(stating that Congress intended to "provide for a pro-compet-
itive, de-regulatory national policy framework designed to ac-
Congress was motivated by the same goals that in-
spired the enactment of the Sherman Act-con-
sumer welfare and competitive marketplaces.8 3 In-
deed, the purpose of the Act is "to promote com-
petition and reduce regulation in order to secure
lower prices and higher quality services for Ameri-
can telecommunications consumers and en-
courage the rapid deployment of new telecommu-
nications technologies." 84 As a result, Congress
made competition the driving force behind the
Telecom Act.8 5 To serve that end, "the regulatory
regime in the 1996 Act contains stringent require-
ments designed to open competition in local tele-
phone service." '86 These requirements are enunci-
ated in section 251 of the Act.87 Section 251 (a)
imposes a broad mandate on all telecommunica-
tions carriers "to interconnect directly or indi-
rectly with the facilities and equipment of other
telecommunications carriers."88 To encourage
competition specifically in the local exchange
market, one of the last "market segments that
have natural monopoly characteristics, '"8 9 section
251 (b) then imposes further duties on all local ex-
change companies. 90 Finally, the ILECs bear addi-
tional burdens under section 251 (c) in order to
prevent them from manipulating their control of
bottleneck facilities to strangle their competitors
and frustrate the very intent of the Telecom Act.91
These additional duties include: "the duty to ne-
gotiate in good faith;" 92 the duty "to intercon-
nect;" 98" the duty to provide nondiscriminatory ac-
celerate rapidly private sector deployment of advanced tele-
communications and information technologies and services
to all Americans by opening all telecommunications markets
to competition . . . ").
85 See Confirmation Hearing Before the Senate Commerce, Sci-
ence & Transportation Comm., 105th Cong. (1997) (statement
of former FCC Chairman William E. Kennard), available at
1997 FCC LEXIS 5431, at *5 (stating that "competition is the
cornerstone of the 1996 Act, and the FCC must continue to
promote competition in every sector of the communications
marketplace").
86 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CONVERGENCE OVERVIEW 17 (2001).
87 47 U.S.C. §251 (2001).
88 See id. §251(a)(1).
89 Joseph D'Kearney & Thomas W. Merrill, The Great
Transformation of Regulated Industries Law, 98 COLUM. L. REv.
1323, 1364 (1998).
90 47 U.S.C. §251 (b). These duties include the duty of
resale, the duty of number portability, the duty of dialing par-
ity, the duty of access to rights-of-way and the duty to recipro-
cal compensation. Id.
91 See id. §251(c).
92 See id. §251 (c) (1).
93 Id. §251 (c) (2).
20021
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
cess to network elements; 94 the duty to provide
telecommunications services for resale at whole-
sale rates; 95 and the duty to allow for physical col-
location of equipment.96
In order to encourage compliance on the part
of the incumbents with the requirements of sec-
tion 251, Congress fashioned a trade under sec-
tion 271 by predicating BOC entry into the long
distance market on the satisfaction of the mar-
ket-opening provisions of section 251. 9 7 Former
FCC Chairman William Kennard described this
barter as "a simple yet clever proposition: in ex-
change for opening their local facilities to com-
petitors, the 1996 Act provides the BOCs with the
substantial reward of the long distance 'carrot."' 9
Under section 271, a BOC can petition the Com-
mission on a state-by-state basis to provide in-re-
gion interLATA services.99 In order to obtain sec-
tion 271 approval, though, the petitioning BOC
must demonstrate to the individual state public
utility commissions that they have complied with
the 14-point competitive checklist, which directly
incorporates the competitive provisions of section
251.100 The Commission, in consultation with the
Attorney General, must then make a determina-
tion on the application within 90 days.""' Thus,
while the Telecommunications Act may be a dif-
ferent means than the Sherman Act, they are both
94 Id. §251(c)(3); see also id. §251(d)(2) (Congress man-
dated that, in deciding which network elements should be
made available on an unbundled basis, the Commission must
determine whether access to particular network element is
"necessary" and whether requesting carrier would be im-
paired in providing service without access to particular ele-
ment).
95 Id. §251 (c) (4).
96 Id. §251 (c) (6).
97 See 47 U.S.C. §271 (2001).
98 Hearing Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary on H.R.
1686 - The "Internet Freedom Act" and H.R. 1685 - The "Internet
Growth and Development Act," 106th Cong. (2000) (statement
of former FCC Chairman William E. Kennard). See also Hear-
ing on Reviewing Competition and Antitrust Issues Relating to the
Telecommunications Act Before the Senate Judiciary Subcomm. on
Antitrust, Business Rights and Competition, 106th Cong. 22
(1999) (statement of former Assistant Attorney General of
the DOJ Antitrust Division Joel I. Klein) (stating "how abso-
lutely critical section 271 is to achieving the Act's market-
opening goals... One of the most ambitious aspects of the
Act is that it requires and expects the incumbent local ex-
change carriers to assist competitors that wish ultimately to
take away its customers. Imagine how much more difficult
this process would be without the incentive of long distance
entry for the Bell companies.").
99 See 47 U.S.C. §271 (d) (1).
100 See id. §271 (c) (2) (B).
101 See id. §271(d)(3); see also §271 (d)(2)(A); see also
designed to accomplish the same end of competi-
tion. 10 2 Recognizing this, Congress intended the
two statutory schemes to coexist harmoniously. As
a result, even though Congress stipulated specific
behavioral guidelines intended to promote com-
petition in the local exchange marketplace, Con-
gress also affirmatively included an express an an-
titrust savings clause. 10 3 Section 601(b) (1) specifi-
cally provides that "nothing in this Act ... shall be
construed to modify, impair, or supersede the ap-
plicability of any of the antitrust laws." 104 Simi-
larly, Congress incorporated an implied antitrust
savings clause providing that "[t] his Act ... shall
not be construed to modify, impair, or supersede
Federal, State or local law unless expressly so pro-
vided."'11 5 This antitrust savings clause is standard
language used in other federal regulations to ex-
press the continued applicability of antitrust laws
even when Congress seeks to impose more spe-
cific behavioral obligations to govern certain
forms of competition. For instance, the language
of section 601(b) (1) is identical to the language
of the antitrust savings clause used in the Energy
Policy Act of 1992, which states that certain sec-
tions relating to wholesale transmission services
"shall not be construed to modify, impair, or su-
persede the antitrust laws."'11 6 The standard lan-
guage used in the express'0 7 and implied 108 anti-
Turetsky, supra note 80, at 554-55 ("the legislation also as-
signs the Antitrust Division a strong role in evaluating Bell
Operating Company applications for entry into the long dis-
tance market, requiring that the FCC accord 'substantial
weight' to the Division's evaluations.").
102 See, e.g., Turetsky, supra note 80 ("[A] ntitrust is a criti-
cal ally of competition - it is not a tool to pick winners and
losers, but rather a tool to ensure that competitive markets
do so."); see also, e.g., Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub.
L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56 (an act "[t]o promote competi-
tion ...").
103 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 143, §601(b)(1). See also 142 CONG. REc.
H1145-06, HI171 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (statement of Rep.
Conyers) (" [t]he antitrust savings clause ... ensures any and
all ... anticompetitive activities are fully subject to antitrust
laws.").
104 Id.
105 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 143, §601 (c) (1).
106 Energy Policy Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102486, 106
Stat. 2916, §722(2) (2001); see also Public Utility Regulatory
Policies Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-617, 92 Stat. 3120, §4
(2001) ("Nothing in this Act or in any amendment made by
this Act affects . . . the applicability of the antitrust laws to
any electric utility or gas utility... ").
17 See Telecommunications Act of 1996, Publ L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 143, §601(b)(1).
108 See Energy Policy Act §722(2).
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trust savings clauses of the Telecom Act is based
on the statutory precedents in the energy, electric
utility and natural gas industries. 0 9 Congress's
clear intent in enacting the Telecommunications
Act with an express antitrust savings clause was to
ensure that a proper remedy was available to con-
strain certain anticompetitive behavior and that
such behavior was not shielded from over 100
years of antitrust case law. The statutory construc-
tion of the Telecom Act and the legislative history
surrounding its enactment demonstrate Con-
gress's intent to preserve the role of the Depart-
ment of Justice and the antitrust laws in opening
local markets to competition.
C. Goldwasser
Goldwasser v. Ameritech was a federal class action
109 See generally James R. Atwood, Antitrust, Joint Ventures,
and Electric Utility Restructuring: RTGs and Poolcos, 64 ANTI-
TRUST L.J. 323, 325-28 (1996); see also Telecommunications
Act §601 (c) (1).
110 Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d at 392 ("Plaintiffs-appellants
Richard Goldwasser, Michael Cohn, Eric Carter, and Richard
Lozon are citizens of Illinois, Wisconsin, Indiana, and Michi-
gan, respectively. Those states ... are the ... states in which
defendant Ameritech provides local telephone service. The
Goldwasser plaintiffs . . . are consumers of local telephone
services in Ameritech's area.").
111 Goldwasser I, No. 97 C 6788, at 2.
112 Goldwasser Hl, 222 F.3d, at 394-95.
The complaint specifies 20 specific exclusionary or mo-
nopolistic practices . . . (1) Ameritech is not providing
the same quality of service to its competitors as it pro-
vides to itself, in violation of §251. (2) Again in violation
of §251, Ameritech has not given its competitors nondis-
criminatory access to its operational support systems,
nor has it given them access to unbundled elements of
its systems on terms equivalent to those Ameritech en-
joys. (3) Ameritech has failed to provide "dark fiber" as
an unbundled network element, in violation of the 1996
Act. (4) Ameritech has failed to provide its competitors
access to poles, ducts, conduits, and rights-of-way on a
nondiscriminatory basis, in violation of §§251 and 271.
(5) Ameritech has failed fully to unbundle its network
elements, including local loops, local transport, and lo-
cal switching, in violation of §251 (c) (3). (6) Ameritech's
competitors have experienced undue delays (presuma-
bly caused by Ameritech) in acquiring unbundled ele-
ments, and those delays have precluded them from of-
fering services as attractive as Ameritech's. (7) The com-
petitors have also experienced delays and discrimination
as they have sought to gain access to unbundled loops,
in violation of §251(c)(3). (8) Ameritech has failed to
provide unbundled access to local transport interoffice
transmission facilities on a discriminatory basis, in viola-
tion of §251 (c) (3). (9) Ameritech has failed to provide
local switching to competitors, in violation of
§271 (c) (2) (B) (vi). (10) Ameritech discriminates against
suit brought against Ameritech on behalf of four
local telephone service consumers in each of
Ameritech's service regions." 0  The plaintiffs
blamed the lack of competition in the local tele-
phone market on the exclusionary practices of
Ameritech, which controlled more than "90 per-
cent of the markets for local telephone service in
its geographic areas." 11 Citing 20 specific monop-
olistic behaviors that violated Section 2 of the
Sherman Act' and the Telecom Act,12 the plain-
tiffs claimed that Ameritech had not only affirma-
tively impeded competitors' ability to enter those
markets served by Ameritech but also had failed
to grant competitors access to its "so-called essen-
tial facilities."' ' 3 The plaintiffs claimed that such
anticompetitive acts violated Section 2 of the
Sherman Act by denying consumers a choice
among competitive carriers and, as a result, raised
competitors by requiring competitive LECs and competi-
tors to pay originating and terminating access charges,
when it cannot collect interstate access charges. (11)
Ameritech has failed to offer or provide customized
routing, which is required to be provided as part of un-
bundled local switching. (12) Ameritech has not pro-
vided dialing parity to competitors for services such as
operator assistance ("0"), directory assistance ("411"),
and repairs ("611"), in violation §271(c) (2) (b) (xii).
(13) Ameritech has failed to provide access to its own
911 and emergency services on a nondiscriminatory ba-
sis, in violation of §271 (c) (2) (B) (vii) (1). (14) Ameritech
has continued to bill customers of competitors who have
converted from Ameritech's services, and hence some
customers are being double- billed, thereby harming the
competitors' good will. (15) Ameritech has failed to pro-
vide interconnection between its network and those of
competitors that is equal to the interconnections it gives
itself, in violation of §§251 (c) (2) and 271 (c) (2) (B) (i).
(16) Ameritech has not complied with §272(b) (3) of the
1996 Act, which requires a BOC and its interLATA affili-
ates to have separate officers, directors, and employees.
(17) Ameritech has failed publicly to disclose all transac-
tions with §272 affiliates, in violation of §272(b) (5). (18)
Ameritech has refused to sell to its competitors, on just,
reasonable, and nondiscriminatory terms, access to com-
ponents of its network on an unbundled or individual
basis. (19) Ameritech has refused to sell to its competi-
tors local telephone services at wholesale prices that are
just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory, which prevents
the competitors in turn from offering attractive resale
prices to consumers. (20) Ameritech has refused to al-
low its competitors to connect with its local telephone
network on just, reasonable, and nondiscriminatory
terms.
113 Goldwasser I, 222 F.3d, at 394 (including "its tele-
phone lines, equipment, transmission, and interconnection
stations in [Ameritech's] markets." The Supreme Court has
held that the incumbents' competitors are not able to dupli-
cate those facilities.). See, e.g., AT&T v. Iowa Board of Utili-
ties, 525 U.S. 366 (1999).
2002]
COMMLAW CONSPECTUS
prices for local telephone service.' 14 In addition,
the plaintiffs claimed that these anticompetitive
acts violated mandatory access provisions of the
Telecommunications Act. 1 1 5 According to the
plaintiffs, these violations "have restrained and sti-
fled any meaningful competition for local tele-
phone services in the relevant markets . . . and
have perpetuated its monopolization of local tele-
phone services."' 6 The plaintiffs therefore sought
the standard antitrust remedy of treble damages
and declaratory and injunctive relief.' 7
The district court dismissed the case on the ba-
sis of three rationales. First, the court held that
the "filed rate" doctrine first recognized in Keogh
v. Chicago & N.WR. Co."I 8 bars recovery of dam-
ages based upon claims of overcharging. 1 9 Rely-
ing on In Re Wheat Rail Freight Rate Antitrust Litiga-
tion,120 the court found that such claims of
overcharging were subject to the filed rate doc-
trine because the remedy sought by the plaintiffs
was linked to the allegedly inflated filed rates.' 2 '
Second, the court held that plaintiffs did not have
standing to bring suit to require Ameritech to
comply with the market-opening provisions of the
Telecom Act. According to the court, such "claims
could severely threaten the delicate balance that
Congress has struck in attempting to ease the
transition of the telecommunications industry
into a competitive marketplace."'122 Finally, the
court held that the Telecom Act establishes no af-
firmative duties to consumers; therefore, plaintiffs
have no cause of action based upon breach of
these duties under the Telecom Act. ' 23 On the ba-
sis of these three holdings, the court subsequently
114 Id. at 392.
115 Id. at 399. (Plaintiffs accused Ameritech of "failing to
comply with its myriad duties under §§ 251, 252 and 271 of
the telecommunications law.").
116 Class Action Complaint, Nature of the Action at 2,
Goldwasser I, No. 97C6788, (N.D. Ill. Sept. 26, 1997).
117 Id. at 21.
118 260 U.S. 156 (1922). The Court in Keogh held once
rates had been filed with and approved by the Interstate
Commerce Commission by the Commission, those filed rates
were deemed to be "reasonable and nondiscriminatory." Id.
at 161; see also County of Stanislaus v. Pacific Gas & Elec. Co.,
114 F.3d 858, 862 (9th Cir. 1997), cert denied, 522 U.S. 1076
(1998) (upholding the filed rate doctrine and explaining
that "[s]ince the 1920s, the 'filed rate' or 'filed tariff' doc-
trine has barred antitrust recovery by parties claiming injury
from the payment of a filed rate for goods or services").
119 Goldwasser I, 222 F.3d, at 402.
120 759 F.2d 305 (7th Cir. 1985).
121 Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d, at 402.
granted Ameritech's 12(b) (6) motion to dismiss
the case for failure to state a claim.
Even though the Seventh Circuit disagreed with
the lower court on the standing issue, a three-
judge panel of the Seventh Circuit affirmed the
remainder of the lower court's decision. In over-
turning the lower court's finding that the plain-
tiffs lacked standing, the Seventh Circuit first
found that the plaintiffs were "direct purchas-
ers.., forced to pay an alleged monopolistic over-
charge."'124 The Seventh Circuit found that the
plaintiffs, as subscribers of Ameritech local tele-
phone service,'1 25 therefore satisfied the threshold
standing requirement set forth in Illinois Brick Co.
v. Illinois.12 6 In addition, the court found that the
plaintiffs had described the proper antitrust harm
that the antitrust laws are designed to prevent 27
by asserting the alleged consequential increased
prices of local telephone service.' 28
Despite making an affirmative finding of stand-
ing, the Seventh Circuit ultimately rejected the
plaintiffs' claims on the basis that the alleged vio-
lations of the Telecom Act were beyond the reach
of the Sherman Act. The court held that that the
Telecom Act imposed "more specific and far-
reaching obligations" than those imposed by anti-
trust laws. 129 "The fundamental fallacy in the
plaintiffs' theory is that the duties the [Telecom
Act] imposes on ILECs are coterminous with the
duty of a monopolist to refrain from exclusionary
practices."'130 The court based its holding on its
interpretation that Congress had the opportunity
to adopt an antitrust scheme to achieve competi-
tion in the local markets. 131 Yet, according to the
122 Goldwasserl, No. 97 C 6788, at 10.
123 Id. at 11.
124 Goldwasser I, 222 F.3d, at 398.
125 Id.
126 431 U.S. 720 (1977) (holding that suits by indirect
purchasers were barred).
127 Associated General Contractors of Calif., Inc. v. Calif.
State Council of Carpenters, 459 U.S. 519, 539 (1983) (Su-
preme Court held that plaintiff lacked standing because it
"was neither a consumer nor a competitor in the market in
which trade was restrained." The Goldwasser plaintiffs, in con-
trast, were consumers in the relevant markets where the al-
leged monopolistic acts by Ameritech occurred).
128 Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d, at 398 (holding that plaintiffs
had made the requisite antitrust injury showing).
129 Id. at 401.
130 Id. at 399.
131 See id. (holding that "Congress could have chosen a
simple antitrust solution to the problem of restricted compe-
tition in the local markets").
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court, in enacting the Telecom Act, Congress
chose instead to create a regulatory scheme based
on chutes and ladders through which the incum-
bent monopolist must jump.' 32 The court stated
that these "kinds of affirmative duties to help
one's competitors . . . do not exist under the
unadorned antitrust laws."'133 Because the require-
ments under the Telecom Act are more specific
and onerous than those found in any antitrust
laws, the court refused to apply the antitrust laws
to such violations. 34
The court thus rejected the plaintiffs' claims
that the breaches of duties under the Telecom
Act are tantamount to antitrust violations, assert-
ing instead that it would be both "illogical and un-
desirable" to hold that such a failure to comply
with the Telecom Act necessarily constitutes an
antitrust violation. 135 First, this conclusion would
be illogical because the link between a violation of
a statutory regime and a monopolistic practice
may be too attenuated to be properly redressed
through antitrust means.1 36 Second, this infer-
ence would be undesirable because the "antitrust
laws would add nothing to the oversight already
available under the 1996 law."' 137 According to the
court, the enforcement structure set forth in the
Communications Act that charges the Commis-
sion with specific oversight responsibility is more
than adequate to deal with such alleged anticom-
petitive practices.1 38
Finally, in considering whether any of the plain-
tiffs' allegations could amount to a "freestanding
antitrust claim," the court held that the plaintiffs'
antitrust claims were too "inextricably linked" to
be divorced from the claims based on the
Telecom Act. 139 Because the Telecom Act is more
specific, the court determined it must trump the
132 Id. (finding that Congress, "in an effort to jump-start
the development of competitive local markets ... imposed a
host of special duties on the ILECs").
33 Id. at 399-400 (referring to special ILEC-specific re-
quirements, FCC and state public utility commissions' over-
sight, and "a system of negotiated agreements" to accomplish
local competition).
134 Id. at 401.
135 Id. at 400.
136 See id. at 400 (citing numerous examples of other laws
that dominating firms could violate regardless of its dominat-
ing market position, including an agricultural firm that vio-
lates safety or cleanliness food processing regulations; a com-
puter processor firm that violates employment discrimination
prohibitions; or a pharmaceutical firm that violates the Food
and Drug Administration's rules applicable to new drugs).
137 Id. at 401.
more general antitrust laws when both are impli-
cated in the same complaint.140 While the court
explicitly noted that the Telecom Act did not con-
fer "implied immunity on behavior that would
otherwise violate the antitrust law," the court did
hold that the Telecom Act must also enforce any
duty that arises under the Telecom Act.141 There-
fore under Goldwasser, consumers and competi-
tors, and potentially the Antitrust Division of the
Department of Justice ("DOJ"), are barred from
using antitrust remedies to redress violations of
the Telecom Act in non-competitive markets.142
The court indicated that antitrust remedies
should be reserved for deregulated, competitive
markets, such as the long-distance market cre-
ated after the government and new market en-
trants successfully broke up AT&T's monopoly. 43
Contrasting the state of these competitive markets
with the current status of the local exchange mar-
kets, which are still subject to the Telecom Act's
"detailed regulatory regime," the court held that
"[a]t some appropriate point down the road, the
FCC will undoubtedly find that local markets have
also become sufficiently competitive that the tran-
sitional regulatory regime can be dismantled and
the background antitrust laws can move to the
fore."' 4 4
D. Split in Lower Courts has Created Legal
and Regulatory Uncertainty
Several district courts, in interpreting the spe-
cific boundaries of these two legislative schemes,
have rejected the holding of Goldwasser and al-
lowed the plaintiffs' antitrust claims to stand.
These decisions have effectively denied those de-
fendants any de facto antitrust immunity. 145 In
138 Id.
139 Id.
140 See id. (holding that the "1996 Act is... more specific
legislation that must take precedence over the general anti-
trust laws, where the two are covering precisely the same
field").
141 Id.
142 Id. at 401-02.
143 See id. at 401.
144 Id. at 401-02.
145 See, e.g., Electronet Intermedia Consulting, Inc. v.
Sprint-Florida, Inc., No. 4:00-cv176-RH (N.D. Fla. Sept. 21,
2000); Bell At. Network Services, Inc. v. Ntegrity Telecontent
Servs., Inc., No. 99-5366 (D.N.J. Nov. 1, 2000); Stein v. Pacific
Bell Co., No. C 00-2915SI, 2001 WL 1358946 (N.D. Cal. Feb.
14, 2001); CalTech Int'l Telecom Corp. v. Pacific Bell, No. C-
97-2105-CAL (N.D. Cal. Oct. 25, 2000) (order regarding is-
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CalTech Int'l Telecom Corp v. Pacfic Bell, the court
held that "the Telecom Act does not 'impair' the
application of the antitrust laws to the telecom-
munications industry."146 As a result, the court an-
nounced its intention to judge CalTech's allega-
tions that Pacific Bell had failed "to provide the
facilities and services mandated by the Telecom
Act" and CalTech's contentions that Pacific Bell's
facilities were "essential facilities" by the "stan-
dards of the antitrust laws."'147 The court simply
demanded the required Sherman Act showing.
Ultimately, the jury reached a verdict for the
plaintiff in the amount of $1.4 million.
Similarly, the district court in Stein v. Pacific Bell
denied a second Goldwasser motion proffered by
Pacific Bell.148 The court dismissed the plaintiffs'
antitrust claims for denying essential facilities and
monopoly leveraging; however, the court allowed
the plaintiffs' antitrust claims based on violations
of an interconnection agreement under the
Telecom Act to stand. 149 The court distinguished
its holding from Goldwasser on the basis of the
plaintiffs' allegations of violations in "bad faith
and . . . other exclusionary practices." 50 Accord-
ing to the court, the Goldwasser court never ad-
dressed the issue of "whether violations of the
1996 Act, if done in a 'predatory' manner... can
make up an independent basis for liability under
the Sherman Act."' 15' The Stein plaintiffs, in con-
trast to the Goldwasser plaintiffs, presented the
court with a satisfactory showing of attempted mo-
nopolization through allegations of "predatory'
behavior."' 52 In denying the defendant's motion
to dismiss, the court reasoned "Stein has alleged
the type of conduct that exceeds a monopolist's
right to deal or not to deal with competitors, in
sues for trial); Covad Comunications.Co. v. Pacific Bell, No. C
98-1887SI, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22789 (N.D. Cal. Dec. 14,
1999).
146 CalTech Int'l Telecom Corp. v. Pacific Bell, Order Re-
gardingIssuesfor Trial, No. C-97-2105-CA, 1 (N.D. Cal. Oct.
25, 2000) (order regarding issues for trial).
147 CalTech Int'l Telecom Corp. v. Pacific Bell, Order Re-
gardingIssuesfor Trial, N.D. Cal. Case No. C-97-2105-CAL (or-
der filed Oct. 25, 2000); see also Consolidated Gas. Co. of Fla.,
Inc. v. City Gas Co. of Fla., 880 F. 2d 297, 301 (11th Cir.
1989) (holding that "[p]ervasive regulation will not protect
an industry from antitrust liability for 'conduct that is volun-
tarily initiated'") (quoting MCI Communications Corp. v.
American Tel. & Tel. Co., 708 F.2d 1081, 1103 (7th Cir.), cert
denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983)).
148 Stein v. Pacific Bell Co., No. C 00-2915SI, 2001 WL
1358946, at *10 (N.D. Cal. Feb. 14, 2001).
149 Id. at *10-11.
150 Id.
violation of section 2 of the Sherman Act.' 1 53 The
district court therefore rejected Pacific Bell's ex-
pansive reading of Goldwasser and allowed the
plaintiffs' antitrust claims to stand.
Likewise, in Electronet Intermedia Consulting, Inc.
v. Sprint-Florida, Inc., the district court denied the
ILEC's motion to dismiss. 154 A footnote in the or-
der distinguished the case from Goldwasser
It is true, as Sprint notes, that a violation of the
[Telecom Act], without more, does not an antitrust vio-
lation make. In the case at bar, however, unlike in Gold-
wasser, there are allegations of misconduct separate and
apart from any alleged violations of the [Telecom Act]
(internal citations omitted). 15 5
The Florida district court therefore refused the
defendant's requests for antitrust immunity and
allowed Electronet's claims under the antitrust
laws to go forward.1 56 Similarly, the court in Covad
Communciations Co. v. Pacific Bell, a pre-Goldwasser
decision, also found sufficient evidence was
presented by Covad to deny Pacific Bell any sort
of antitrust immunity. 157 The court held that the
"plaintiff has sufficiently alleged that Pacific Bell
has imposed costly and unnecessary conditions
upon access to its network, and intentionally
delayed performance of obligations under the
agreement, in an effort to prevent it from enter-
ing the market.' 158
The court in Law Offices of Curtis v. Tinko, LLP
v. Bell Atlantic Corp., on the other hand, granted
Bell Atlantic's Goldwasser motion to dismiss; how-
ever, it did not entirely rule out the possibility of
an antitrust claim for violation of the Telecom
Act.' 5 9 In that case, the plaintiff "failed to allege
any willful acquisition or maintenance of monop-
oly power by Bell Atlantic."'160 Thus, the court
held that Bell Atlantic's violation of section 251
151 [d.
152 Id.
153 Id. at *7.
154 Electronet Intermedia Consulting, Inc. v. Sprint-Flor-
ida, Inc., No. 4:00cvO76rh (N.D. Fla. Sept. 21, 2000).
155 Id. at 2, n.J.
156 Id. at 2.
157 Covad Communications Co. v. Pacific Bell, No. C 98-
1887SI, 1999 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 22789, at *33 (N.D. Cal. Dec.
14, 1999).
158 Id. at *32-33.
159 Law Offices of Curtis V. Trinko, LLP v. Bell Atlantic
Corp., 123 F. Supp. 2d 738, 741 (S.D.N.Y. 2000).
161) Id. at 741-42 (holding that the plaintiff failed to estab-
lish the second element of a Sherman Act §2 claim, the will-
ful acquisition or maintenance of monopoly power, in point-
ing "to only one act or series of acts taken by Bell Atlantic to
maintain its monopoly power").
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did not equate with a violation of antitrust laws
but left the door open to the possibility of a
stronger showing of unlawful use of monopoly
power that would sustain a Sherman Act claim.
The domino effect of the Goldwasser decision,
though, is clearly evident by other recent deci-
sions that have followed Goldwasser's lead. Relying
on Goldwasser, the Nevada district court in MGC
Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth Telecomms., Inc. re-
jected attempts by MCG Communications, Inc., d/
b/a Mpower Communications Corp. ("Mpower"),
to "enforce BellSouth's obligations under the
Telecommunications Act through the tool of an
antitrust suit."'' The court recited a summary of
Goldwasser and concluded, "[i]n this case, as in
Goldwasser, Mpower's claims are based on alleged
violations of the Telecommunications Act or FCC
orders implementing the Telecom Act."' 62 As a
result, the court found that the violations alleged
by Mpower did not amount to a violation of the
Sherman Act.' 63 Furthermore, the court held that
Mpower's claims that BellSouth denied Mpower
reasonable access to essential facilities are "[a]s
noted in Goldwasser, . . . inextricably intertwined
to the claims under the Telecom Act and, even if
they were not, the Telecom Act is more specific
legislation that takes precedence over the general
antitrust legislation."'1 64 Despite the fact that Gold-
wasser involved a class of consumers, whereas this
case featured a competitor suing the incumbent,
the district court still extended the Goldwasser
holding to reach the same result of de facto im-
munity for competitor suits alleging antitrust vio-
lations in the form of anticompetitive actions.
Similarly, Intermedia filed suit against Bell-
South alleging that BellSouth has been mono-
polizing the telecommunications industry by de-
161 MGC Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1350 (S.D. Fla.
2001).
162 Id. at 1352.
163 Id.
164 Id. at 1352.
165 Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., No. 8:00 Civ-1410-T-24(C), slip op. (M.D.
Fla. Dec. 15, 2000).
166 Id. at 6, relying on AT&T Wireless PCS, Inc. v. City of
Atlanta, 210 F.3d 1322, vacated on other grounds, 223 F.3d 1324
(11th Cir. 2000).
167 Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., No. 8:00 Civ-1410-T-24(C), slip op. at 6
(M.D. Fla. Dec. 15, 2000).
168 Id. at 8.
169 MGC Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth
nying competitors sufficient access to essential fa-
cilities.165 The district court initially interpreted
Goldwasser narrowly by finding that the Telecom
Act and the antitrust laws were independent from
each other rather than co-dependent. 66 It held
that "any behavior that can be the basis for an an-
titrust claim before the creation of the [Telecom
Act] still can be the basis of an antitrust claim af-
ter the creation of the [Telecom Act] ."167 Never-
theless, the court ultimately applied Goldwasser
broadly to dismiss Intermedia's antitrust claims
holding that "all of [Intermedia's] antitrust claims
must fail because they are . . . based on [Bell-
South's] alleged violations of the [Telecom
Act] ... "168 Thus,just as the Nevada district court
did in MCG Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc,1 6 9 the court in Intermedia applied
the holding of Goldwasser to summarily bar com-
petitors' claims of antitrust violations based on ex-
clusionary conduct that also violates the Telecom
Act. 170
Finally, the Richmond, Virginia district court in
Cavalier Telephone, LLC v. Verizon most recently
used the Goldwasser decision to grant Verizon's
motion to dismiss on the basis that Cavalier's alle-
gations "merely represent[ed] violations of the
1996 Act dressed up in antitrust garb.' 171 The
court, citing Goldwasser's holding that "the 1996
Act creates 'more specific and far-reaching obliga-
tions' than those embodied in § 2 of the Sherman
Act,"' 172 consequently held that "Cavalier cannot
state a claim under § 2 of the Sherman Act if it
alleges violations of affirmative duties created by
the 1996 Act."' 173 Thus, despite both the Gold-
wasser court's and the Cavalier court's explicit rec-
ognition of the harmonious nature of the
Telecom Act and the antitrust laws, 174 both deci-
Telecomms., Inc., 146 F. Supp. 2d 1344, 1350 (S.D. Fla.,
2001).
170 Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth
Telecomms., Inc., Brief of the Appellant Intermedia Commu-
nications,lnc., No. 01-10224-JJ, (11th Cir. Mar. 20, 2001) at 4
(describing BellSouth's anticompetitive conduct) and at 28
(describing the lower court's reliance on Goldwasser to dis-
miss Intermedia's antitrust claims).
171 Cavalier Telephone, LLC v. Verizon Virginia, Inc.,
No. 3:01CV736, at 4 (4th Cir. filed Mar. 27, 2001).
172 Id. at 5 (quoting Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d at 401).
173 Id. at 5.
174 See id. at 4 (holding that "the 1996 Act is not at odds
with federal antitrust laws . . . "); see also Goldwasser II, 222
F.3d at 401 (holding that the duties on ILECs imposed by the
Telecom Act "do not conflict with the antitrust laws").
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sions effectively foreclose the availability of anti-
trust remedies for any violations that "are
grounded in the 1996 Act."'175
The split in the district court opinions evi-
dences the legal confusion circulating in the wake
of Goldwasser and the negative domino effect the
decision has had on later court decisions. The va-
rying legal interpretations of the Goldwasser deci-
sion throughout the district courts reveal the
shaky foundation on which the decision stands
and demonstrates the inherent inconsistencies in
statutory interpretation and intent, legal prece-
dent and accepted public policy. As a result, addi-
tional review and an affirmative resolution are
needed to settle the legal and regulatory uncer-
tainty currently surrounding this issue and to halt
the toppling effect of the Goldwasser decision
before it is too late.
II. GOLDWASSER GOT IT WRONG
A. Goldwasser Ignored A Long History of
Reliance on Antitrust Protections and
Enforcement
The Goldwasser court ignored the historical role
that the government and federal antitrust authori-
ties176 have played in both the development of
United States telecommunications policy and in
curbing industry abuse of monopoly power. In
175 Cavalier Telephone, No. 3:01CV736, at 10.
176 See William E. Kovacic, Downsizing Antitrust: Is It Time
to End Dual Federal Enforcement?, ANTITRUST BULL. 505, 508
(1996) ("The federal antitrust statutes and court decisions in-
terpreting them have created four major enforcement
agents: two federal agencies (the DOJ and the FTC), the state
attorneys general, and private parties such as businesses and
consumers").
177 Modification of FinalJudgment, United States v. AT&T,
552 F. Supp, 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub nom., Maryland
v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983); see, e.g.,Jim Chen, The
Legal Process and Political Economy of Telecommunications Reform,
97 COLUM. L. REV. 835, 852 (1997) (the divestiture agree-
ment, which broke up AT&T into seven RBOCs, has been
called "the crowning achievement of American telecommuni-
cations law's first century").
178 PRACTICING LAW INSTITUTE, TELECOMMUNICATIONS
CONVERGENCE OVERVIEw 56 (2001); see, e.g., Lawrence A. Sul-
livan, Elusive Goals Under the Telecommunications Act: Preserving
Long Distance Competition Upon Baby Bell Entry and Attaining Lo-
cal Exchange Competition: We'll Not Preserve the One Unless We
Attain the Other, 25 Sw. U. L. REV. 487, 527 (1996) ("The lack
of capacity of regulators to deal with [anticompetitive] tactics
is emblematic of the pre-MFJ period. The FCC's failure to
inhibit such practices through regtlatory means was docu-
mented at the trial of DOJ's case against AT&T.").
179 United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp. 131 (D.D.C.
fact, during the pre-Modification of Final Judg-
ment 177 phase through the passage of the
Telecom Act, the Department of Justice and the
federal court system were more influential in
shaping the telecommunications industry than
the Commission. 178 In 1974, the Antitrust Division
of the Department of Justice initiated suit against
AT&T for a broad litany of antitrust violations
stretching back 70 years. 179 Assistant Attorney
General William Baxter found "the source of
AT&T's monopoly power to be in its control over
the local networks, which had been protected
from competition as a result of state regulation
for over seventy years."' 80 In United States v.
AT&T, the court considered the overlapping reg-
ulatory schemes:
[T]he Antitrust Division faced an initial burden of es-
tablishing that AT&T's conduct was not exempt from
the antitrust laws by virtue of FCC regulation. In fact,
the FCC generally supported the Division's assertion of
antitrust jurisdiction and, with this help, the govern-
ment was able to defeat preliminary jurisdictional mo-
tions.1
8 1
While Judge Greene specifically addressed the is-
sue of whether the communications statutes con-
ferred an implied immunity from antitrust law, he
"held that immunity could not be implied from
such regulation."' 8 2 The court affirmed the result-
ing consent decree entered into by all the parties
1982) (complaint filed Nov. 20, 1974), afffd sub. nom. Mary-
land v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983). In addition to
the monumental divestiture of AT&T, the judiciary also filed
over 40 private antitrust suits against AT&T.
180 Geoffrey M. Peters, Is the Third Time The Charm? A
Comparison of the Government's Major Antitrust Settlements with
AT&T This Century, SETON HALL L. REv., 252, 268 (1985).
181 Donald I. Baker, Government Enforcement of Section
Two, 61 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 898, 916 (1986).
182 George J. Alexander, Antitrust and the Telephone Indus-
try After the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 12 SANTA CLARA
COMPUTER & HIGH TECH L.J. 227, 244 (1996); see also United
States v. American Tel. & Tel. Co., 461 F. Supp. 1314, 1321-
22 (D.C. Cir. 1978) (holding that "[t]he Supreme Court has
repeatedly noted that 'repeals of the antitrust laws by implica-
tion from a regulatory statute are strongly disfavored, and
have only been found in cases of plain repugnancy between
the antitrust and regulatory provisions'") (quoting Otter Tail
Power Co. v. United States, 410 U.S. 366, 372). In this case
against AT&T, the court also explained in a footnote that
"[e]ven when the regulation is 'pervasive,' and the precise
conduct attacked in an antitrust suit is being regulated, an
immunity will be found only if the antitrust remedy conflicts
with rather than complements the enforcement efforts of the
regulatory agency." Id. at 1326, n.36 (citing Mt. Hood Stages,
Inc. v. Greyhound Corp., 555 F.2d 687 (9th Cir. 1977).
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in 1982 in the Modification of Final Judgement
("MFJ").
The problem in 1974 of "attempted entry of
competing telephone companies" that was being
barred by AT&T is similar to the one that is at the
heart of Goldwasser. 18s Yet despite the history ofju-
dicial intervention in the three previous antitrust
settlements with AT&T, 18 4 the court in Goldwasser
was unwilling to step in likewise against Amer-
itech. 18 5 Despite citing the AT&T success story
and pointing to the long-distance industry as a
model of competition, the court overlooks the
fact that the antitrust case played an instrumental
role in achieving that success. 18 6 The Goldwasser
court believed that this "success of the companies
that challenged AT&T's hegemony over long dis-
tance shows that" competition could similarly be
achieved in the local exchange market. 18 7 This
faulty premise overlooks the fact that "the devel-
opment of local exchange competition is simply
an order of magnitude more complicated, more
labor-intensive and more capital-intensive than
was the development of long distance competi-
tion.' 88 In its historical narrative describing the
events leading up to the passage of the Telecom
Act, the court recognized the applicability of anti-
trust laws in the context of the AT&T monopoly
breakup. However, when comparing the long-dis-
tance and local marketplaces and touting the suc-
cess of the long distance industry competitors, the
court ignored the "sheer complexity of the task"
of breaking into the local market as compared to
entering the long distance market.'8 9 Even more
importantly, the Goldwasser court ignored the
plain fact that the long distance companies
achieved their success only after the 1982 settle-
ment of the government's antitrust suit against
183 Geoffrey M. Peters, Is the Third Time The Charm? A
Comparison of the Government's Major Antitrust Settlements with
AT&T this Century, 15 SETON HALL L. Rcv. 252, 274 (1985).
184 See Decree, United States v. AT&T (D. Or. 1914) (or-
der of Sept. 7 modifying decree of Mar. 26, 1914) (the first
settlement reached with AT&T); see United States v. Western
Elec. Co., 1956 Trade Cas. (CCH) P68,246 (D.N.J. Jan. 24),
vacated and replaced, 1982-2 Trade Cas. (CCH) P64,900
(D.D.C. 1956) (the second settlement with AT&T); see Modifi-
cation of Final Judgment, United States v. AT&T, 552 F. Supp,
131 (D.D.C. 1982), afjfd mem. sub nom., Maryland v. United
States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983) (the third settlement reached
with AT&T).
185 Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d at 390.
186 Id. at 399. Statistics show that since 1982, "long-dis-
tance prices for residential customers have declined sixty-six
percent, in real terms; minutes of use have increased dramat-
AT&T, and the resulting consent decree, broke
up the AT&T monopoly by legally forcing a sepa-
ration between AT&T's long lines and AT&T's lo-
cal exchange companies in order to ensure MCI
and other long distance companies had access to
the local network infrastructure. 90
B. Goldwasser Ignored the Plain Language of
the Telecom Act
The Goldwasser court also ignored the plain lan-
guage of the Act. The 1996 Telecommunications
Act expressly preserved the relevance and applica-
bility of the antitrust laws within a new statutory
scheme. The antitrust savings clause states, "noth-
ing in this Act or the amendments made by this
Act shall be construed to modify, impair, or super-
sede the applicability of any of the antitrust
laws." 191 Congress, through the plain language of
the statute, forbade any subversion of the antitrust
laws. The Seventh Circuit in Goldwasser ignored
this express recognition of the ongoing applicabil-
ity of the antitrust laws in the telecommunications
regulatory arena, as United States Attorney Gen-
eral John Ashcroft recently testified:
In the enactment of the 1996 telecommunications re-
form measures, the Congress expressed its will and in-
tent with very substantial clarity with a savings clause in-
dicating that the antitrust prerogatives that inure to the
enforcement authorities would remain in place. When
the [Goldwasser court] . . . wrote an opinion which was
interpreted to mean this was no longer the case, we felt
it very important that the [DOJ] again reiterate what
the Congress had explicitly, in our judgment, made
clear in the 1996 Act.'
9 2
Congress therefore expressly preserved the role
of antitrust law to assist in the achievement of the
objectives of the Telecom Act with the inclusion
ically; and there are now literally hundreds of long distance
carriers from which to choose."John H. Shenefield, Antitrust-
The Next One Hundred Years, 70 ST. JOHN's L. REv. 189, 203
(1996).
187 Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d at 390.
188 Kennard Statement, supra note 12, at 14.
189 Id.
190 See Modification of Final Judgment, United States v.
AT&T, 552 F. Supp, 131 (D.D.C. 1982), affd mem. sub nom.,
Maryland v. United States, 460 U.S. 1001 (1983).
191 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 156, §601(b)(1).
192 Hearing before the House Judiciary Comm. on the Depart-
ment of Justice, 107th Cong. (2001) (testimony of U.S. Attor-
ney General John Ashcroft) (commenting on the DOJs ami-
cus brief filed in Intermedia Comm., Inc. v. BellSouth
Telecomm., Inc.).
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of a specific antitrust savings provision. Further-
more, in light of the Supreme Court's decision in
Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., neither the courts nor agencies can
substitute their own interpretations of such clear
language. 193 The Supreme Court has held that
when Congress has clearly pronounced its statu-
tory intent in the plain language it chooses, this
pronouncement effectively binds both the courts
and government agencies. 194
In addition to the inclusion of this express pro-
vision, the architects of the Act continued to im-
plicitly preserve the applicability of federal anti-
trust laws with the additional clause "[t]his Act
and the amendments made by this Act shall not
be construed to modify, impair, or supersede Fed-
eral, State, or local law unless expressly so pro-
vided in such act or amendments." 195 Thus, in
stating that "[t]he 1996 Act is, in short, more spe-
cific legislation that must take precedence over
the general antitrust laws, where the two are cov-
ering precisely the same field," 19 6 the Goldwasser
court clearly ignored the congressional pro-
nouncement that nothing in the Telecom Act
shall "be construed to modify, impair or super-
sede Federal . . . law."' 19 7 Despite the plain lan-
guage of the statute forbidding such action, the
Seventh Circuit effectively gave antitrust law the
backseat to the Telecommunications Act and con-
ferred antitrust immunity upon those companies
whose behavior is so anticompetitive that it not
only violates the Telecom Act but also is tanta-
mount to violation of the antitrust laws. ' 8 Gold-
wasser therefore ignored the Telecom Act's clear
mandate that the provisions of the Communica-
tions Act and the antitrust laws are both to be
used as tools to deter and arrest anticompetitive
conduct. 19 9
C. Goldwasser Ignored the Legislative History of
the Telecom Act
Even if there was some question as to the plain
language of the statute, the legislative history sur-
rounding the Telecom Act alone demonstrates
that both the legislative and the executive
branches of the government intended to protect
the applicability of the antitrust laws. In the floor
debate preceding the passage of the Telecom Act,
members of Congress repeatedly emphasized the
continuing role that antitrust laws must play, ex-
plaining that "[r]elying on antitrust principles is
vital to ensure that the free market will work to
spur competition and reduce government involve-
ment in the industry."20"1 This sentiment was
echoed by Senator Thurmond, Chairman of the
Senate Judiciary Committee's Antitrust, Business
Rights and Competition Subcommittee, one week
before the signing of the Act:
[T] he unequivocal antitrust savings clause ... explicitly
maintains the full force of the antitrust laws in this vital
industry... Application of the antitrust laws is the most
reliable, time-tested means of ensuring that competi-
tion, and the innovation it fosters, can flourish to bene-
fit consumers and the economy.
2 0
'
Then, on the day of the signing of the Telecom
Act, the Executive Branch reaffirmed the impor-
tance of the antitrust laws in helping to achieve
the goals of the Telecom Act. President Clinton
explicitly applauded the antitrust savings clause,
stating, "the Act's emphasis on competition is also
reflected in its antitrust savings clause. This clause
ensures that even for activities allowed under or
required by the legislation, or activities resulting
from FCC rulemaking or orders, the antitrust laws
continue to apply fully."202 The legislative record
clearly demonstrates both the legislative and exec-
utive branch recognition of the past role of the
193 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense
Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984).
194 Id.; see also WILLIAM F. Fox, JR., UNDERSTANDING AD-
MINISTRATIVE LAw 412 (Matthew Bender & Co., Inc. 3rd ed.
1997) (1986) (stating that under the Chevron doctrine, if
Congress has directly addressed the matter in question, then
"both agency and courts must defer to the Congressional po-
sition irrespective of their own views on the subject").
195 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Star. 156, §601(c) (1).
196 Goldwasser I1, 222 F.3d at 401.
197 Telecommunications Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-
104, 110 Stat. 156.
198 Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d at 401-402.
199 See Intermedia Communications, Inc. v. BellSouth
Telecommunications, Inc. 173 F. Supp. 2d 1282 (11th Cir.
2000).
210 141 CONG. REC. S18586-01 (daily ed. Dec. 14, 1995)
(statement of Sen. Leahy).
201 142 CONG. REC. S687-01, 8711 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Thurmond).
202 President William J. Clinton, Statement Upon Sign-
ing S. 652, Feb. 8, 1996, 1996 U.S.C.C.A.N. 228-1, 228-3.
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antitrust laws in transforming traditional monopo-
listic markets into competitive ones and the intent
of both government branches that the antitrust
laws continue to play that role.
Even more specifically, however, Congress dis-
cussed the future applicability of the antitrust laws
in the newly envisioned deregulated telecommu-
nications marketplace. The record demonstrates
congressional recognition of the critical role of
the antitrust laws in prying open the traditional
Bell monopolies:
[T]he bill contains an all-important antitrust savings
clause which ensures that any and all . . . anticompeti-
ive activities are fully subject to the antitrust laws....
And by maintaining the role of the antitrust laws, the
bill helps to ensure that the Bells cannot use their mar-
ket power to impede competition and harm consum-
ers.
2 0 3
The legislative history of the Telecom Act thus
clearly supports Congress's intent that the anti-
trust laws be applied in conjunction with the der-
egulatory principles of the Telecom Act to achieve
a competitive telecommunications market. As
shown by the affirmative considerations of both
the antitrust laws in general and the antitrust sav-
ings clause specifically, Congress did not intend
for the Telecom Act to preempt antitrust laws and
confer antitrust immunity upon the incumbent lo-
cal exchange monopolies.
The Goldwasser court, however, ignored such
considerations in concluding that only after the
Commission makes the determination that local
markets are sufficiently competitive can "the tran-
sitional regulatory regime . . . be dismantled and
the background antitrust laws can move to the
fore."20 4 Perhaps predicting such a challenge,
Senate Commerce Committee Chairman and
Telecommunications Act Conference Committee
203 142 CONG. Rc. H1145-06, H1171 (daily ed. Feb. 1,
1996) (statement of Rep. Conyers).
204 Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d at 401-02.
205 142 CONG. Ric. S687-01, S687 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Pressler).
206 Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d at 399-400.
207 Id. at 399 (Congress "entrusted supervision of those
duties to the FCC and the state public utility commis-
sions . . . ").
208 See, e.g., 142 CONG. REc. S687-01 (Feb. 1, 1996) (state-
ment of Sen. Hollings) ("the Department ofJustice was pro-
tected in the sense that what we did was have the savings
clause for all antitrust laws included, positive language, and
the substantial weight of the Department of Justice be given
by the Federal Communications Commission in their deci-
sion").
209 See 142 CONG. Rrc. H1157 (Feb. 1, 1996) (statement
of Rep. Hyde) ("the conferees acknowledge the long experi-
Chairman Larry Pressler stated on February 1,
1996 that the Telecom Act "does not affect our
antitrust laws. The antitrust laws stay in place.
20 5
Contrary to the court's opinion in Goldwasser that
the antitrust laws are supplanted by the Telecom
Act and should only be triggered once a market
has become sufficiently competitive, the legisla-
tive record thus confirms congressional intent
that antitrust laws should play a major and contin-
uing role in keeping the Bell incumbents' monop-
olistic practices in check. 206
Furthermore, Goldwasser appoints the Commis-
sion as the sole government agency responsible
for implementing the Telecom Act. 20 7 However,
the legislative history of the Telecom Act demon-
strates congressional intent that both the FCC and
the DOJ guide such implementation. 208 Through-
out legislative debates, Congress recognized the
historical role that the DOJ had played in acting
as our "country's antitrust expert. '" 20 9 Similarly,
Congress acknowledged the successful, historical
role that antitrust laws played in introducing com-
petition to strangled markets. 21 0 Because of this
established DOJ role and the traditional promi-
nence of antitrust laws, Congress explicitly stated
that the Telecom Act "does not disrupt the Na-
tion's antitrust law and does not change the DOJ's
role in policing unfair competition and predatory
pricing. '" 211 The antitrust laws therefore remain in
effect as one of the DOJ's primary policing tools.
Furthermore, the Goldwasser court established
that the more specific rules of the Telecom Act
displaced the antitrust laws.2 1 2 Congress, how-
ever, specifically addressed the applicability of the
antitrust laws, despite the existence of FCC regula-
tions:
ence and considerable expertise [the DOJ] has developed in
this field"); see also 142 CONG. REc. S698 (Feb. 1, 1996) (state-
ment of Sen. Kerrey) ("[t]he Antitrust Division has unrivaled
expertise in assessing marketplace effects, particularly so in
telecommunications, where it has been deeply involved con-
tinuously for more than 20 years").
210 See, e.g., 142 CONG. Rrc. H1171 (Feb. 1, 1996) (state-
ment of Rep. Conyers) ("Antitrust law is synonymous with
low prices and consumer protection-and that is exactly
what we need in our telecommunications industry").
211 142 CONG. REC. S718 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996) (state-
ment of Sen. Exon).
212 Goldwasser I, 222 F.3d at 401 ("The 1996 Act imposed
duties on the ILEC that are ... more specific and far-reach-
ing obligations ... The 1996 Act is... more specific legisla-
tion that must take precedence over the general antitrust
laws.").
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During the Antitrust Division's antitrust case in the
1970's against the Bell system ... some argued that the
existence of FCC regulations displaced the antitrust
laws and made them inapplicable. The courts emphati-
cally rejected that challenge them [sic], and the anti-
trust savings clause in the bill today makes clear that
that question cannot be reopened. 2 13
The legislative history of the Telecom Act there-
fore effectively forecloses the interpretation of the
Goldwasser court that the more specific regulations
of the Telecom Act displace the traditional appli-
cability of the antitrust laws.
Finally, in addition to affirmative congressional
consideration of the continued applicability of
the antitrust laws, the implication of the congres-
sional repeal of Section 221 (a) of the Communi-
cations Act also demonstrates congressional in-
tent to prevent any interpretation of antitrust im-
munity.2 14 Section 221 (a) had created an antitrust
safe-haven for telecommunications mergers by
rendering transactions deemed by the Commis-
sion to be in the public and consumers' interest
immune from antitrust review. 215 The Senate re-
port analyzing the bill explains this conscious ef-
fort to eliminate any antitrust immunity, stating,
"[t]he repeal would not affect the Commission's
ability to conduct any review of a merger for Com-
munications Act purposes . . . Rather, it would
simply end the Commission's ability to confer an-
titrust immunity." 21 6 Congress thus realized that
any form of antitrust immunity would be counter-
productive in achieving its goal of a competitive,
deregulated telecommunications marketplace. 217
This determination bolstered the overall congres-
sional determination to preserve the authority of
antitrust authorities to enforce the Act through
the antitrust savings clause. 218
213 142 CONG. REc. S687-01, S711 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Thurmond).
214 See 47 U.S.C. §221 (a) (repealed by Telecommunica-
tions Act of 1996, Pub. L. No. 104-104, 110 Stat. 56).
215 Maurice E. Stucke & Allen P. Grunes, Antitrust and the
Marketplace of Ideas, 69 ANTrrRUST L. J., 249, 290 (2001).
216 S. Rep. No. 104-230 (1996), at 442, available at 1996
WL 54191.
217 142 CONG. REC. S687-01, 711 (daily ed. Feb. 1, 1996)
(statement of Sen. Thurmond); see also id. ("The importance
of the antitrust savings clause is underscored by the decision
to repeal section 221(a) of the Communications Act of
1934 ... the fact that this exemption has been eliminated in
this legislation is another confirmation that the Congress in-
tends for the antitrust laws to be the means by which free
markets are maintained in telecommunications.").
218 See id.
D. Goldwasser Ignored Legal Precedent
Extensive legal precedent shows that a regula-
tory scheme like the Communications Act does
not confer immunity from antitrust liability upon
those who fall under the regulatory scheme. In a
private antitrust suit initiated by MCI Communi-
cations Corp. against AT&T, AT&T moved to dis-
miss the suit.2 19 MCI survived the motion to dis-
miss by demonstrating that "AT&T had unlawfully
prevented interconnection for newly deregulated
long distance providers with its then monopoly
over the network for local telephone service that
was necessary to complete both ends of any long
distance call." 22 0 The court in the Seventh Circuit,
the same circuit of Goldwasser, stated, "the mere
pervasiveness of a regulatory scheme does not im-
munize an industry from antitrust liability for con-
duct that is voluntarily initiated. '" 221 The Seventh
Circuit went even further by characterizing the lo-
cal networks at issue in the case as "essential facili-
ties" to impose antitrust liability for refusal to in-
terconnect.222 The court defined an essential fa-
cility as "one that competitors must have, but are
unable, for economic or technical reasons, to rep-
licate. Therefore, unless access to the facility is
mandated, competition of any kind cannot oc-
cur."223 The Seventh Circuit in Goldwasser thus ig-
nored its own binding precedent22 4 in recently
holding that Ameritech was entitled to regulatory
immunity and rejecting AT&T's assertion of an
antitrust immunity defense in MCI v. AT&T. De-
spite the fact that AT&T was then in control of the
"local distribution facilities" and that AT&T was
subject to FCC regulations to regarding intercon-
219 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d 1081,
1101 (7th Cir. 1983), cert denied, 464 U.S. 891 (1983).
220 Spencer Weber Waller, Antitrust as Consumer Choice:
Comments on the New Paradigm, 62 U. Prrr. L. REv. 535, 537
(2001).
221 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d at
1103.
222 Id. at 1132-33.
223 Alexandra M. Wilson, Harmonizing Regulation by Pro-
moting Facilities-Based Competition, 8 GEO. MASON L. REv. 729,
743 (2000).
224 See generally Haas v. Abrahamson, 910 F.2d 384, 393
(7th Cir. 1990) (holding that a legal decision remains con-
trolling "unless and until [it has] been overruled or under-
mined by the decisions of a higher court, or other super-
vening development... ").
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nection requirements, the Goldwasser court cre-
ated an antitrust immunity exception for ILECs
that runs directly afoul of its own legal prece-
dent.225
IV. THE DOMINOS OF GOLDWASSER-
CONGRESS MUST STEP INTO THE
GAME BEFORE COMPETITION LOSES
While the two separate statutory schemes-the
Telecom Act and the antitrust laws-may employ
different mechanisms to accomplish the same end
of a competitive marketplace, the compatibility of
these two schemes is explicitly recognized in the
express and implied antitrust savings clauses of
the Telecom Act, the legislative history of the Act
and extensive legal and historical precedent. The
Goldwasser court, however, based its holding on
the incompatibility of the two sets of procedures.
This holding is motivated by the fear that "the
elaborate system of negotiated agreements and
enforcement established by the Telecom Act
could be brushed aside by any unsatisfied party
with the simple act of filing an antitrust action."226
As a result, the Goldwasser court determined that
the Telecom Act, as the more specific legislation,
should control. At first blush, the Goldwasser deci-
sion may seem to give the Telecom Act more
teeth. In actuality, such conferral of de facto anti-
trust immunity on the incumbent undercuts Con-
gress's intentions in enacting the market-opening
provisions of the Act and threatens to sever the
historic partnership between the Commission and
the DOJ which guarantees the DOJ a role in re-
viewing the monopoly power of the RBOCs. 2
2 7
This decision has broad, negative policy ramifi-
cations. The drafters of the Telecom Act con-
structed a careful balance to alleviate a traditional
monopoly power. Goldwasser upsets this balance
by eliminating the use of antitrust remedies to
225 MCI Communications Corp. v. AT&T, 708 F.2d at 1133-
34.
226 Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d at 401.
227 Letter from F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., House Judi-
ciary Committee Chairman, to Dennis Hastert, Speaker of
the U.S. House of Representatives 6 (May 1, 2001) [hereinaf-
ter Letter from Sensenbrenner] (on file with the author)
("Given the Justice Department's unique expertise in com-
petitive matters, Congress expressly provided within §271
that the Department would review RBOC compliance with
the market-opening provisions of the Act and that the Fed-
eral Communications Commission would give the Depart-
ment's analysis substantial weight in making its decision with
constrain behavior that may be related to the mar-
ket-opening provisions of the Telecom Act but are
so anticompetitive as to amount to a harm of the
sort traditionally governed by antitrust. In doing
so, Goldwasser only encourages the monopoly Bell
companies to continue behaving as monopolists
so as to be protected from the reach of the anti-
trust laws. Goldwasser disturbs almost 50 years of
established antitrust jurisdiction and jurispru-
dence, leaving the existing telecommunications
markets fraught with regulatory uncertainty. 228 In
order to achieve the Sherman Act's and the
Telecom Act's goals of competitive marketplaces,
the procedures set forth in the Telecom Act must
be used in tandem with the remedies available
under the antitrust laws. Because of the courts' re-
fusal to consider these principles together, Con-
gress must clarify its intention that antitrust laws
apply to those fact situations where the Bell com-
pany abuses its monopoly power to thwart compe-
tition. House Judiciary Committee Chairman Sen-
senbrenner explained the need for such a Gold-
wasser remedy:
At a minimum, we must reverse the Seventh Circuit's
recent decision in the Goldwasser case. That decision
directly contradicts the clear congressional intent that
the antitrust laws should continue in force in this indus-
try. Goldwasser simply reads the antitrust savings clause
out of the law, and it must be corrected ... This sector
of our economy achieved its current vibrancy because
of the application of the antitrust laws. Only through
the continued application of the antitrust expertise of
this Committee will that free market vibrancy con-
tinue.
2 2 9
Specifically, Congress must enact legislation to
stop the domino train of Goldwasser in its tracks by
defeating the Goldwasser court's assumption of
mutual exclusivity of the Telecom Act and the an-
titrust laws. During the 1 0 7Th Congress, Congress-
man Chris Cannon, along with House Judiciary
Committee Ranking Member John Conyers, intro-
duced H.R. 1698, the "American Broadband
respect to an RBOC application to provide long distance ser-
vice); see also 47 U.S.C. §271 (d) (2) (A).
228 See generally, Letter from Sensenbrenner, supra note
227, at 2-5 (discussing the historical precedent for antitrust
oversight).
229 Hearing on H.R 1698, the "America Broadband Competi-
tion Act of 2001," and H.R 1697, the "Broadband Competition
and Incentives Act of 2001, "Before the House Comm. on the Judici-
aty, 107th Cong. 8 (2001) (statement of Rep. F. James Sen-
senbrenner, Chairman, House Judiciary Comm.), available at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/sensenbrenner052201.
htm.
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Competition Act of 2001" (Cannon-Conyers
bill) .230 This bill would resolve the regulatory con-
fusion created by Goldwasser by ensuring "that the
antitrust laws can be used against the Bell Compa-
nies if they fail to comply with the law .... that
competitors can interconnect with the Bell Com-
pany network, and [promote] the development of
competitive local telecom markets." 2 3 Specifi-
cally, Title I of the bill would clarify that antitrust
laws apply to violations of requirements imposed
by the Telecom Act and not preempted by the
Telecom Act.2 32 In addition, Title II of the bill
would create mandatory alternative dispute reso-
lution processes to resolve efficiently any disputes
arising under local interconnection agree-
ments. 23 3 This bill would not drastically rewrite
existing antitrust law or current telecommunica-
tions policy. Rather, the Cannon-Conyers bill
would "simply sharpen the] relation between anti-
trust law and Act, resulting in 'preservation of
competition in our industry' ,,.234
Opponents of the Cannon-Conyers bill argue
that it would "scrap years of antitrust jurispru-
dence" and "reverse Congress's judgment five
years ago to deregulate the telecommunications
industry, promote competition and empower
agencies, rather than antitrust courts."2 3 5 They
base their arguments on three general proposi-
tions.
First, they contend that the bill is unnecessary
because the Seventh Circuit court in Goldwasser
did not explicitly recognize any implied antitrust
immunity for ILECs under the Telecom Act. They
cite to the majority decision:
Our principle holding is thus not that the Telecom Act
confers implied immunity on behavior that would oth-
erwise violate the antitrust law... It is that the Telecom
Act imposes duties on the ILECs that are not found in
the antitrust laws. Those duties do not conflict with the
antitrust laws either; they are simply more specific and
far-reaching obligations that Congress believed would
230 H.R. 1698, 107th Cong. (2001).
231 Letter from John Windhausen,Jr., President, Associa-
tion for Local Telecommunications Services, to House Judici-
ary Committee Chairman F.James Sensenbrenner,Jr. 1 (May
17, 2001) (on file with author).
232 H.R. 1698, supra note 231.
233 Id.
234 Sensenbrenner Sees More Information Needed on Data Bills,
WARREN'S CABLE REcULATION MONITOR, May 28, 2001 (state-
ment ofJeffrey Blumenfeld); see also Hearing on H.R. 1698, the
"America Broadband Competition Act of 2001, "and H. 1697, the
"Broadband Competition and Incentives Act of 2001," Before the
House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 8 (2001) (statement
of Jeffrey Blumenfeld).
accelerate the development of competitive markets. 2 3 6
In actuality, despite the majority's recognition
of the important role of the antitrust savings
clause, the Goldwasser court also suggested that
competitors may never assert antitrust suits
against monopoly carriers who maintain control
of their local networks in manners that stifle com-
petition. Thus, competitive carriers are effectively
denied the opportunity to pursue antitrust reme-
dies when the incumbent monopoly carriers have
failed to comply with the requirements of the
Telecom Act because, under a Goldwasser analysis,
"the Telecom Act is more specific legislation that
must take precedence over the general antitrust
laws." 23 7 Furthermore, specifying that "back-
ground antitrust laws can move to the fore" only
after the Commission finds "that local markets
have ... become sufficiently competitive that the
transitory regulatory regime can be dismantled,"
the Goldwasser court erases any role for antitrust
laws until markets have become sufficiently com-
petitive and ignores the role that antitrust laws are
supposed to play in helping to achieve competi-
tive markets in the first place.238 The Cannon-
Conyers proposal would stop the dominos of Gold-
wasser by clarifying that the antitrust laws are not
preempted by requirements imposed by the
Telecom Act, thereby preserving the availability of
antitrust remedies.2 39
Second, opponents argue that the Cannon-
Conyers bill will only encourage a hodgepodge of
litigation thereby actually harming competi-
tion. 2411 They believe that a Goldwasser remedy will
only encourage competitive carriers to avoid
agency action and instead take the antitrust
route.24' The expediting mechanisms set forth in
the Cannon-Conyers bill however, would help to
minimize the number of potential lawsuits by
making region-wide alternate dispute resolution
235 Sensenbrenner Sees More Information Needed on Data Bills,
WARREN'S CABLE REG. MONITOR, May 28, 2001 (statement of
William Barr, Verizon General Counsel); see also Hearing on
H. 1698, the "America Broadband Competition Act of 2001, "and
H.R. 1697, the "Broadband Competition and Incentives Act of
2001," Before the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 8
(2001) (statement of William P. Barr) [hereinafter Barr state-
ment].
236 Goldwasser II, 222 F.3d at 401.
237 Id.
238 Id. at 401-02.
239 H.R. 1698, supra note 231.
240 See generally Barr statement, supra note 236.
241 Id.
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processes available. 242 The availability of alterna-
tive dispute resolution processes would therefore
actually decrease the overall amount of lawsuits
ultimately initiated by providing an alternate ave-
nue for the enforcement of disputes arising under
the interconnection agreement negotiation pro-
cess.
Opponents of the legislation also argue that the
Commission's procedures enable quick resolution
of such dusputes and that allowing such an alter-
nate path would result in delay and uncer-
tainty.24 3 In actuality, "over the last few years, the
FCC has promised consumers choice and compe-
tition in broadband services, but nothing that it
did was enough for many DSL competitors to sur-
vive against dominant regional Bell telecommuni-
cations powerhouses." 244 The lack of FCC en-
forcement has therefore created a challenging
telecommunications landscape for competitors
hoping to break into the local exchange market.
The Cannon-Conyers bill, however, would pro-
vide for stronger, quicker enforcement mecha-
nisms through the institution of a time clock on
the alternate dispute resolution process so as to
prevent the RBOCs from litigating and appealing
their competitors into extinction .245
V. CONCLUSION
The competitive telecommunications industry
is at a critical juncture. Hundreds of new start-up
companies invested over $56 billion in deploying
innovative technologies and have created almost
100,000 new jobs. The Goldwasser decision, how-
ever, threatens to undermine these critical invest-
ments and to stem the tide of innovation and
competition. Perhaps anticipating such a chal-
lenge, the drafters of the Telecom Act included a
specific antitrust savings clause and a general sav-
ings clause preserving the applicability of all Fed-
242 H.R. 1698, supra note 231.
243 See generally Barr statement, supra note 236.
244 BROADBANDINFO.COM, Bell DSL Rates Rise, Cable Likely
to Benefit, at http://www/broadbandinfo.com/news-
print.asp?ContentD=2147432508 (last visited Nov. 15, 2001).
245 H.R. 1698, supra note 231.
246 AT&T Corp. v. Iowa Utilities Bd., 525 U.S. 366, 397
(1999).
247 However, in a recent decision, Covad Communs. Co. v.
BellSouth Corp., 2002 U.S. App. LEXIS 15486 (11th Cir. 2002),
the U.S. I Ith Circuit Court of Appeals distinguished Gold-
wasser in part and rejected it in part, stating:
..we cannot agree with Goldwasser to the extent that it is
read to say that a Sherman Act antitrust claim cannot be
eral law, both of which were crafted using stan-
dard savings clause statutory language. Then, to
clarify Congress' intent in including these two
provisions and to eliminate any confusion as to
the continued function of the antitrust laws,
prominent House and Senate members and Presi-
dent Clinton issued explanatory statements
describing the exact role that antitrust laws were
to play in opening up the local market to competi-
tion. Finally, so as not to clip the role of the DOJ,
Congress even repealed the ability of the Commis-
sion to immunize telecommunications mergers
from antitrust scrutiny. Thus, while Supreme
Court Justice Scalia characterized the Telecom
Act as "a model of ambiguity or indeed of self-con-
tradiction," for the purposes of the determining
the continued applicability of the antitrust laws,
Congress drafted a model of clarity with its unam-
biguous assertion of the role of antitrust laws in
the Telecom Act.246
Despite such a clear Congressional mandate,
the Goldwasser court still effectively forecloses, the
availability of antitrust remedies. The Can-
non-Conyers bill, or similar legislation based on
that bill, is therefore needed to stop the dominos
of Goldwasser. Congress recognized that the part-
nership of antitrust law and telecommunications
regulation is crucial to the achievement of compe-
tition in the local marketplace. Without both of
these tools at their disposal, both the regulators
and those that they have been appointed to pro-
tect, the consumers, are at the mercy of the Bell
monopolies. The domino train started by Gold-
wasser threatens to topple the progress made thus
far.24 7 Armed with the Goldwasser decision, the
RBOCs will not hesitate to aggressively protect
their monopoly in the local network, destroying
any progress already made and forever eliminat-
ing the hope of a competitive local exchange mar-
ket. Only Congress can stop the toppling effect of
brought as a matter of law on the basis of an allegation
of anti-competitive conduct that happens to be 'inter-
twined' with obligations established by the 1996 Act.
At the same time, we agree with Goldwasser that merely
pleading violations of the 1996 Act alone will not suffice
to plead Sherman Act violations. Thus, a claim that a de-
fendant failed to live up to its contractual obligations
under an agreement made pursuant to the 1996 Act in
and of itself will be insufficient to establish an antitrust
violation. However, if a plaintiff also pleads facts that, if
true, tend to show an anticompetitive purpose to create
or maintain a monopoly, then that plaintiff has pleaded
an antitrust violation.
Id.
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Goldwasser by reaffirming the intent and the lan-
guage of the Telecom Act that the antitrust laws
and telecommunications regulations and policies
that complement each other must be used to-
gether. Through the passage of the Cannon-Cony-
ers bill or other similarly crafted legislation, Con-
gress can finish what it started back in 1890 with
the passage of the Sherman Act by bringing irre-
versible competition to the monopoly-dominated
local telecommunications market. If Congress
fails to do so, then the game will soon be over and
competition will come toppling down.
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